The Dilemma of Interstatutory Interpretation by Desai, Anuj C.
Washington and Lee Law Review 
Volume 77 Issue 1 Article 5 
3-23-2020 
The Dilemma of Interstatutory Interpretation 
Anuj C. Desai 
University of Wisconsin Law School, anuj.desai@wisc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Litigation 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anuj C. Desai, The Dilemma of Interstatutory Interpretation, 77 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 177 (2020), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol77/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law 
Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
177 
The Dilemma of Interstatutory 
Interpretation  
Anuj C. Desai* 
Abstract 
 
Courts engage in interstatutory cross-referencing all the time, 
relying on one statute to help interpret another. Yet, neither courts 
nor scholars have ever had a satisfactory theory for determining 
when it is appropriate. Is it okay to rely on any other statute as an 
interpretive aid? Or, are there limits to the practice? If so, what 
are they? To assess when interstatutory cross-referencing is 
appropriate, I focus on one common form of the technique, the in 
pari materia doctrine. When a court concludes that two statutes 
are in pari materia or (translating the Latin) “on the same 
subject,” the court then treats the two statutes as though they were 
one. The doctrine thus permits judges to use ordinary doctrines of 
intra-statute interpretation across the two statutes. Determining 
that two statutes are “on the same subject” thus gives interpreters 
a powerful tool of interstatutory interpretation. 
How, then, should courts determine whether to treat two 
statutes as one? If we frame the question through the lens of the 
two currently predominant theories of statutory  
interpretation — textualism and intentionalism—we can see that 
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the traditional approach of asking about the statutes’ “subject 
matter” in the abstract makes little sense. For textualist judges 
who care about objective meaning, it makes more sense to engage 
in interstatutory cross-referencing if and only if the audience for 
the two statutes—the appropriately informed objective reader of 
the statutes—is the same. For interpreters who care about 
subjective legislative intent, interstatutory cross-referencing would 
generally be appropriate if and only if the two statutes were 
drafted by and came through the same Congressional committees.  
Even if one rejects my proposed approaches, thinking about 
how to fit interstatutory cross-referencing into modern theories of 
statutory interpretation raises some confounding issues for those 
theories. In particular, it requires textualists to articulate 
explicitly who the audience for any given statute is, for without 
doing so, the textualist has no theoretical basis for determining 
when interstatutory cross-referencing is appropriate and when it 
is not. Thus, irrespective of the specifics of my proposals, looking 
at the ancient doctrine of in pari materia through the lens of 
modern theories of statutory interpretation sheds light on 
important questions about statutory interpretation that courts and 
theorists have largely ignored.  
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I. Introduction 
Statutory interpretation theory has failed to grapple 
seriously with a common technique in statutory interpretation: 
interstatutory cross-referencing.1 Courts do it all the time,2 and 
                                                                                                     
 1. I borrow the term from Professor William Buzbee. See William W. 
Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
171, 174 (2000); see also Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law 
Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for 
the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32 (1998) 
(discussing the use of interstatutory cross-referencing as part of the Court’s 
“integrative function in the larger lawmaking process”). 
 2. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the 
Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 221, 234–36 (2010) (showing that for the 166 statutory interpretation cases 
determined by the Roberts Court during its first three and a half terms, the 
Supreme Court referenced other statutes 39.2% of the time). 
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yet scholars and courts have no theoretical framework for when it 
is appropriate. To start, it is not even clear as an analytical 
matter whether a second statute, one that is not the statute being 
interpreted, is an intrinsic or extrinsic aid to interpretation.3 Is a 
cross-referenced statute just part of the broader context for the 
statutory provision being interpreted? Or, because it is outside 
the four corners of the statute being interpreted, is it thus 
effectively comparable to, say, legislative history? Or, is it 
comparable to looking at a dictionary as an interpretive aid, 
which despite being an “extrinsic” aid in literal terms, is viewed 
as an acceptable source by virtually all judges, including 
textualists who reject the use of legislative history? So, for 
example, is the fee-shifting provision of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act part of the broader context for understanding the 
fee-shifting provisions in the Civil Rights Act Amendments of 
1976?4 Or, should courts ignore it because it is a different statute 
altogether? How should courts, whether using a textualist or 
intentionalist methodology, decide whether it is appropriate to 
look to the former when interpreting the latter? It turns out, 
courts have no good way to answer this question, and, for all the 
focus on the theory of statutory interpretation over the last four 
decades,5 scholars have not answered the question in any 
analytically satisfying way either.6  
                                                                                                     
        3. Compare, e.g., NORMAN J. SINGER, 2B STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 51.01, at 170 (6th ed. 2000) (referring to other statutes as an 
“extrinsic aid”), with id. § 51.01, at 172–73 (referring to the technique as “a 
variation of the principle that all parts of a [single] statute should . . . be 
construed together”). 
 4. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88 (1991) 
(using the fee-shifting provisions the Toxic Substances Control Act and others to 
interpret whether expert fees in civil rights litigation could be shifted to the 
losing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988)); see 
generally infra Part III.D. 
 5. See Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of 
Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 3 (2003) (referring to “the continuing 
cascade of statutory interpretation theories over the past twenty years”).  
 6. See Deborah W. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The 
Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 866 (2012) 
(noting that “[q]uestions regarding how courts determine whether a valid 
statutory precedent controls a case, particularly when the case arose under a 
different statute, . . . have been far less considered [by scholars]”). 
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In this Article, I address the question of when a court should 
cross-reference another statute to help its interpretive process, 
but I do so through the lens of modern theories of statutory 
interpretation. I take no position on the appropriateness of any 
given methodology, but instead start with the two principal 
modalities of statutory interpretation in the federal courts today: 
textualism and intentionalism.7 I focus on a long-standing 
doctrine, one that dates at least as far back as Blackstone,8 the 
so-called “in pari materia” (or “on the same subject”) doctrine, and 
seek to understand when that doctrine should apply based on 
those two modalities. 
As we will see, the payoff is significant. By doing this, I 
address the question of when courts should engage in 
interstatutory cross-referencing. More importantly though, 
viewing the question through the lens of modern theories of 
statutory interpretation not only helps us understand 
interstatutory cross-referencing, but also reflects back to shed 
light on the theories of statutory interpretation themselves. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II explains what the in 
pari materia doctrine is and then explains where it fits 
jurisprudentially as a technique in statutory interpretation.  
Part III looks at interstatutory cross-referencing through the 
lens of textualism as a modality in statutory interpretation. For a 
textualist, the question of when interstatutory cross-referencing 
is appropriate has no easy answer: there is no plain meaning to 
rely on, no dictionary to turn to, and no linguistic canon to apply. 
Instead, one must look to the underlying rationales of textualism 
and to the notion of the appropriately informed objective reader. 
                                                                                                     
 7. As a preliminary matter, I should note that my discussion throughout 
is premised on the interpretation of federal statutes in federal court. Many of 
the principles might apply, with appropriate adjustments, to the interpretation 
of state statutes. But, as will be apparent shortly, because my proposals are 
based on both the lawmaking process and the audience for particular statutes, 
they depend on factors that will vary between the federal and state levels and 
from state to state. More on why I have chosen intentionalism, but not 
purposivism below. See infra Part IV.A. 
 8. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
*60 n.54 (14th ed. 1803) (“It is an established rule of construction that statutes 
in pari materia, or upon the same subject, must be construed with reference to 
each other.”). 
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As I explain in more detail, to be true to those rationales and to 
textualism’s emphasis on the objective meaning of the text 
requires consideration of factors outside of the textualist’s usual 
toolbox: it requires an explicit articulation of who the statutory 
reader for a particular statute is and whether the audience for 
the two statutes is the same. I go further and argue that doing 
this effectively requires the interpreter to understand the 
boundaries of legal practice areas in the real world of lawyering, 
but even if one disagrees with that claim, the question of 
determining a statute’s audience cannot be avoided. 
Part IV turns to the intentionalist modality in statutory 
interpretation as a lens for determining when interstatutory 
cross-referencing is appropriate. In contrast to textualists, who 
are focused on statutory readers, subjective intentionalists focus 
on statutory authors. I argue that a subjective intentionalist can 
make a first-cut probabilistic determination of whether two 
statutes are “on the same subject” based on whether the two 
statutes originated from the same Congressional committee. 
Because this is obviously a proposal rooted in and dependent on 
the lawmaking process, I also address the ways in which changes 
to the lawmaking process might affect the proposal. 
I conclude with some reflections on the implications all this 
has for statutory interpretation more broadly. 
II. Statutes In Pari Materia 
The in pari materia doctrine is one of numerous ways to 
engage in interstatutory cross-referencing, to use one statute to 
help understand another. When a court concludes that two 
statutes are in pari materia, or (translating the Latin) “on the 
same subject,” the court then treats the two statutes as though 
they were one.9 Provisions within the two statutes must thus be 
harmonized.10 
                                                                                                     
 9. See, e.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (noting 
that statutes addressing the same subject should be read “as if they were one 
law”) (internal citations omitted). 
 10. See NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.2 (7th ed. 2019) (“[C]ourts try to construe [even] 
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In applying the doctrine, courts tend to approach the project 
of harmonization through one of two different lenses. 
Traditionally, courts would harmonize to “make sense” of the two 
statutes together.11 In essence, this meant reconciling potentially 
conflicting provisions so that each had independent meaning or 
ensuring that the two statutes worked together in a coherent 
fashion. Doing so would often entail some measure of policy 
judgment. In recent years, however, with the rise of textualism as 
a modality in statutory interpretation, the approach to 
harmonization has at times taken on a more textualist tint.12 
Rather than harmonize to make policy sense of the two statutes 
as a pragmatic matter, courts will now at times turn to linguistic 
canons that they might have used to interpret within a  
statute — canons such as the presumption of consistent usage or 
arguments from negative implication (such as the expressio unius 
canon13)—to ensure that the two statutes are linguistically 
coherent.14 In essence, the idea is that “treating the two statutes 
as one” means harmonizing them linguistically, rather than as a 
policy matter.15 
My focus in this Article though will not be on how to apply 
the in pari materia doctrine. The differing approaches to applying 
the doctrine largely reflect the core differences in interpretive 
methodology in general. Textualists view harmonization as a 
process of linguistic harmonization,16 while purposivists (or, 
                                                                                                     
apparently conflicting statutes on the same subject harmoniously . . . .”). 
 11. See generally id. 
 12. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 424 (4th Cir. 2004), 
rev’d, 546 U.S. 303 (2006), remanded, 445 F.3d 762 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(“[A]pplication of the in pari materia canon reflects the judgment that Congress, 
like other rational speakers, uses words consistently when speaking about 
similar subjects, regardless of its generalized purposes.”). 
 13. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107–11 (“In English, it is known as the 
negative-implication canon.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Teles AG v. Kappos, 846 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111–14 (D.D.C. 
2012) (using the expressio unius canon to ensure linguistic harmonization 
between statutes interpreted in pari materia).  
 15. See Wachovia Bank, 388 F.3d at 422 (applying the in pari materia 
doctrine to conclude that the word “located” had to have the same meaning in 
two different statutes). 
 16. As I explain in more detail below, textualists engage in linguistic 
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perhaps, in this day and age, I should say “those judges who are 
less wedded to a purely textualist modality”)17 view 
harmonization as part of a goal of policy coherence, coherence in 
the real world that the two statutes inhabit. While this is of some 
interest, it probably ranks as a footnote in the broader debate 
about statutory interpretation. 
Instead, I want to focus on the determination of whether two 
statutes are in pari materia, what I will call the same-subject 
determination or Step Zero of the in pari materia doctrine.18 It is 
only after a court answers this question in the affirmative that 
the court can then treat the two statutes as one and then use the 
powerful tools of harmonization in the interpretive process. 
The way in which courts make this determination tends to be 
ad hoc and cursorily made, with little explanation.19 Courts have 
no analytical tools for determining when two statutes are on the 
same subject.20 Indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
the determination is made intuitively and may well be made after 
the judge has decided how the statute should ultimately be 
interpreted. In other words, it seems likely that the 
determination is not in fact one of the levers of decision, but is 
instead a results-oriented fig leaf. 
                                                                                                     
harmonization regularly, using linguistic canons such as the presumption of 
consistent usage or the canon of meaningful variation. See infra Part II.A. The 
phenomenon I address here is the determination of when a textualist should use 
such a technique across statutes. See infra Part II.A. 
 17. See Harvard Law School, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice 
Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE, at 8:28 (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/TK6F-X5X5 (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) (claiming that every 
current Supreme Court Justice is in some sense a textualist, something that 
could not have been said before Justice Scalia joined the bench) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 18. With apologies to Professors Merrill and Hickman. See Thomas W. 
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 912–14 
(2001) (referring to the determination of whether Chevron applies as “Chevron 
Step Zero”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 
(2006). 
 19. Cf. Widiss, supra note 6, at 872 (noting that “it can be difficult to guess 
ex ante which statutes courts will determine to be ‘related’”). 
 20. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 315–16 (2006) 
(providing little guidance for determining whether statutes should be read in 
pari materia aside from noting that subject-matter jurisdiction and venue are 
not “concepts of the same order”). 
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Whether I am right about this or not, the question the 
same-subject determination asks a court to consider is a crucial 
one in many interpretive disputes. Such disputes are, moreover, 
staples of the statutory-interpretation canon and are, for good 
reason, embedded in the pedagogy of statutory interpretation.21 
No good lawyer can ignore interstatutory interpretation. Yet, 
scholars have largely ignored the question, perhaps in part 
because the courts have been so lackadaisical when addressing it. 
As I hope to show, however, the question is deeply 
interesting from a jurisprudential standpoint and helps shed 
light on important questions about the modern theory and 
practice of statutory interpretation. By looking at this ancient 
doctrine through the lens of modern modalities of statutory 
interpretation, we can see aspects of the theories underlying 
those modalities in a new light. 
A. In Pari Materia Explained: How Courts Determine Whether 
Two Statutes Are on “the Same Subject” 
At its core, the in pari materia doctrine is less a doctrine and 
more of an underlying principle, the notion that if two statutes 
are on the same subject, they must cohere, they must harmonize. 
One way to view the in pari materia doctrine then is as a 
pragmatic tool that courts can use to make sense of an area of 
law.22 
The Supreme Court’s explicit references to the in pari 
materia doctrine have been few and far between,23 but even in 
                                                                                                     
 21. See generally, e.g., CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 486–524 
(2011); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES 
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 859–66 (5th ed. 2014); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
857–69 (5th ed. 2009); LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 151–60 (2d ed. 2009). 
 22. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 252 (“The canon is . . . based 
upon a realistic assessment of what the legislature ought to have 
meant . . . . [T]he body of the law should make sense.”). 
 23. Since 1995, the Supreme Court has referenced the in pari materia 
doctrine in only twenty-two cases. See, e.g., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. 
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61 – 64 (2006) (“Given these linguistic differences, the 
question here is not whether identical or similar words should be read in pari 
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these few cases, one can see that the Court has no theoretical 
framework, or even consistent approach, to the same-subject 
determination.24 Importantly, the Court has not even tried to 
articulate a theoretical underpinning for the doctrine other than 
that statutes on the same subject matter must cohere.25 Though 
some scholars have made arguments about specific cases or 
aspects of the problem,26 no one—whether on the Court, in 
academia, or otherwise—has attempted to connect the 
same-subject determination to the theories and modalities of 
statutory interpretation. 
Let us start with the Court’s most recent case addressing the 
in pari materia doctrine, Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt.27 In 
                                                                                                     
materia to mean the same thing.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Estate of 
Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 531 (1998) (“[T]he priority act and the bankruptcy laws 
‘were to be regarded as in pari materia, and both were unqualified; . . . as 
neither contained any qualification, none could be interpolated.’” (quoting 
Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U.S. 152, 158 
(1912))); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711–12 (1996) 
(applying former precedent to reapply the in pari materia doctrine (citing 
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995))). As I noted, 
however, the basic technique of interstatutory cross-referencing, including in 
ways that amount to a use of the in pari materia doctrine, are widespread. See 
supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 24. Compare Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 315–16 (rejecting the in pari 
materia doctrine’s application where matters were not sufficiently related), with 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 548 U.S. at 61–63 (refusing to use the in 
pari materia doctrine due to differences in the language of the statute as a 
whole). 
 25. Notably, Justice Scalia rests the doctrine on the principle that “the 
body of the law should make sense.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 252 
(“It rests on two sound principles: (1) that the body of the law should make 
sense, and (2) that it is the responsibility of the courts, within the permissible 
meanings of the text, to make it so.”). The cases confirm Justice Scalia’s 
characterization. See, e.g., Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 136 (“Courts 
serve the legislature’s purpose best by reading [the statute] to make sense and 
avoid nonsense, and to fit harmoniously within a set of provisions composing a 
coherent chapter of the Judicial Procedure part of the United States Code.”); see 
generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 10, at § 51.2. 
 26. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the 
Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can 
Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 203 
(2017) (arguing that, “[a]bsent clear evidence to the contrary, consistency 
presumptions should not be applied . . . across different statutes”). 
 27. 546 U.S. 303 (2006).  
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Wachovia Bank, the Court unanimously held that a venue statute 
was not in pari materia with a subject-matter jurisdiction 
statute.28 The Court’s reasoning, though, has little potential 
applicability beyond the specific statutes it addressed. To see 
why, the case is worth exploring in some detail. 
Wachovia Bank involved a so-called “national bank”29 that 
brought a diversity action against South Carolina citizens in 
federal court in South Carolina.30 Wachovia’s main office was in 
North Carolina, but it had branch offices in, among other places, 
South Carolina.31 The legal question was thus whether, for 
diversity purposes, Wachovia was a citizen solely of North 
Carolina where it had its main office, or also of all those other 
places where it had branch offices.32 If a national bank were 
deemed to be a citizen of every state in which it has a branch 
office, then Wachovia would be a citizen of (among other places) 
South Carolina, and federal courts would thus not have 
jurisdiction over any action against South Carolina citizens based 
on diversity jurisdiction.33  
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a national bank’s 
citizenship is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1348, which provides that 
national banks are “deemed citizens of the States in which they 
are respectively located.”34 The question in Wachovia Bank thus 
centered on the meaning of the word “located”: Is a national bank 
“located” solely in the state where its main office resides or is it 
also “located” in every state in which it has a branch office?35 The 
key problem, at least from an intentionalist, “faithful servant” 
                                                                                                     
 28. See id. at 316. 
 29. See id. at 306 (“[N]ational banks . . . [are] corporate entities chartered 
not by any State, but by the Comptroller of the Currency of the U.S. Treasury.”). 
 30. See id. at 308 (“[C]itizens of South Carolina sued Wachovia in a South 
Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing them to participate in an 
illegitimate tax shelter. . . . Wachovia [then] filed a petition [in federal 
court] seeking to compel arbitration. . . . As the sole basis for federal-court 
jurisdiction, Wachovia alleged the parties’ diverse citizenship.”). 
 31. See id. at 307. 
 32. See id. at 306–07. 
 33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018) (detailing the instances where federal 
courts would have diversity jurisdiction over the parties). 
 34. Id. § 1348. 
 35. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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approach to statutory interpretation, was that Congress clearly 
did not contemplate the issue: when Congress adopted the 
statute, interstate banking was not permitted and thus national 
banks were not allowed to have branch offices in another state.36 
National banks were first authorized by Congress in 1863,37 and 
the relevant statutory language dated back to 1887,38 with an 
important predecessor statute that Congress had adopted in 
1882.39 Yet, Congress didn’t authorize national banks even to 
have branches at all until the 1920s40 and didn’t provide general 
authorization for national banks to open branches in another 
state until 1994, more than a century later.41 Thus, when it 
adopted the relevant language in the jurisdiction statute in the 
nineteenth century, Congress clearly did not anticipate—indeed, 
could not have anticipated—a national bank with branch offices 
in another state.42 The word “located” obviously referred to the 
one state where the bank had its main office.43 The jurisdiction 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Paul Lund, National Banks and Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 73, 79–80 (2007) (“When Congress first authorized the 
creation of national banks, they were not allowed to operate any branch 
offices.”). 
 37. See id. at 76 (“Congress first authorized the creation of national banks 
in 1863, at the height of the Civil War.”). 
 38. See id. at 81 (describing briefly the 1887 Act’s citizenship language). 
 39. See id. at 80–81 (“The 1882 Act provided that federal court jurisdiction 
over suits involving national banks was to ‘be the same as, and not other than’ 
suits involving a state bank, thereby eliminating automatic federal question 
jurisdiction over all cases to which a national bank was a party.”); Act of July 
12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162, 163. 
 40. See Christian A. Johnson & Tara Rice, Assessing a Decade of Interstate 
Bank Branching, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 81 (2008) (“In 1922, . . . the [Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)] . . . permitted national banks to 
establish branches only within their home city, provided, however, that a state 
bank was permitted to operate branches within that city.”). 
 41. See generally Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 101, 108 Stat. 2338, 2339–43. 
 42. See Lund, supra note 36, at 107 
Authorization of interstate branch banking by national banks was 
still many years in the future at the time the statutory language now 
found in [28 U.S.C. §] 1348 originated or even at the time of its most 
recent recodification. Thus, the effect that branch banking would 
create on national banks’ access to diversity jurisdiction could not 
possibly have crossed Congress’s mind. 
 43. See id. at 82–83 (describing how few courts had analyzed the “located” 
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statute was recodified in 1948, when at least some national banks 
had branch offices, but even then, it did not matter for purposes 
of diversity jurisdiction whether the word “located” meant just 
where the bank’s main office was or encompassed all of its branch 
offices too: either way, the bank was “located” in only one state. 
The expansion of national banks to interstate banking thus 
exposed what Professor Caleb Nelson has rightly referred to as a 
latent ambiguity in the word “located,” one that did not exist at 
the time of passage, either from a subjective or objective 
perspective.44 
The Court concluded that, for jurisdictional purposes, a 
national bank was “located” only where its designated main office 
was.45 Much of its reasoning is not important to me. What is 
important though is its rejection of an argument based on the in 
pari materia doctrine. The Fourth Circuit had concluded that a 
national bank was “located” anywhere it had a branch office, and 
it had relied in part on the fact that the Supreme Court had 
previously interpreted the term “located” in a venue statute for 
national banks “as encompassing any county in which a bank 
maintains a branch office.”46 The very same  
term — “located”—encompassed branch offices in the venue 
statute, and so, the Fourth Circuit had reasoned, since the venue 
statute and the jurisdiction statute were in pari materia, the 
word “located” should have the same meaning in the jurisdiction 
statute.47 Importantly, for my purposes, the Fourth Circuit had 
based its conclusion that the two statutes were in pari  
materia — i.e., it had based the same-subject determination—on 
the fact that “the jurisdiction and venue statutes pertain to the 
                                                                                                     
language issue for most of the statute’s history because it had been a non-issue 
prior to authorization of bank branching). 
 44. See NELSON, supra note 21, at 505 (stating that “from the standpoint of 
the enacting Congress, the word ‘located’ . . . may have harbored a latent 
ambiguity”). 
 45. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006) (“Reading 
§ 1348 in this context, one would sensibly ‘locate’ a national bank 
for . . . qualification for diversity jurisdiction, in the State designated in its 
articles of association as its main office.”). 
 46. Id. at 313. 
 47. See Wachovia Bank, 388 F.3d at 418–20 (using the in pari materia 
doctrine to construe “located” to mean wherever a bank has a branch). 
190 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177 (2020) 
same subject matter, namely the amenability of national banking 
associations to suit in federal court.”48 Thus, the lower court 
explicitly delineated a particular “subject matter,” one that on 
first blush seems pretty narrow—“the amenability of national 
banking associations to suit in federal court”—and then held that 
both provisions—the venue provision and the jurisdiction 
provision — were within that “subject matter.”49 Only then did the 
Fourth Circuit go on to conclude that the word “located” thus had 
to have the same meaning in both statutes.50 This is a classic 
textualist approach to the in pari materia doctrine: where two 
statutes are in pari materia, they must be treated as one 
linguistically, and so the court can apply a linguistic canon across 
the two statutes—here, the presumption of consistent usage. 
Perhaps that is not the right way to apply the doctrine—perhaps 
the court should have attempted to reconcile the policies of the 
two statutes—but given how narrow the “subject matter” was, it 
is hard to imagine rejecting the court’s same-subject 
determination. Yet, the Supreme Court did . . . and did so 
unanimously.51 
The Court concluded that the venue statute and the 
jurisdiction statute were not in pari materia, despite both 
statutes applying narrowly only to national banks. After noting 
that, with respect to national banks in particular, the word 
“located” was “a chameleon word,” sometimes meaning only the 
                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 432. 
 49. See id. at 421–22 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of ‘located’ in Bougas controls the 
meaning of ‘located’ in [§] 1348 . . . . Because the jurisdiction and 
venue statutes pertain to the same subject matter, namely the 
amenability of national banking associations to suit in federal court, 
under the in pari materia canon the two statutes should be 
interpreted as using the same vocabulary consistently to discuss this 
same subject matter. 
 50. See id. at 423 (“Therefore, the two statutes should be treated as in pari 
materia and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ‘located’ in Bougas must 
control the meaning of the same term in [§] 1348.”); supra note 49 and 
accompanying text regarding Bougas. 
 51. See Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 315–16. 
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bank’s main office and at other times including the branch 
offices,52 the Court held that  
[v]enue and subject-matter jurisdiction are not concepts of the 
same order. Venue is largely a matter of litigational 
convenience; accordingly, it is waived if not timely raised. 
Subject-matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns a 
court’s competence to adjudicate a particular category of cases; 
a matter far weightier than venue, subject-matter jurisdiction 
must be considered by the court on its own motion, even if no 
party raises an objection.53 
Therefore, the Court concluded, the fact that it had previously 
held that the word “located” encompassed branch offices in the 
venue statute did not mean that it had to interpret “located” the 
same way in the jurisdiction statute.54 
Despite concluding that the in pari materia doctrine did not 
apply, however, the Court in effect went on to apply the 
policy-coherence approach to the in pari materia doctrine. One 
important policy rationale for why the term “located” in the venue 
statute included all of the national bank’s branch offices, the 
Court concluded, was treating national banks the same as 
state-chartered banks and corporations.55 In contrast, if the word 
“located” in the jurisdiction statute included all of a national 
bank’s branch offices, this would result in national banks having 
far more limited access to federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction than an ordinary corporation or state-chartered 
                                                                                                     
 52. See id. at 313–14, 318 (“To summarize, ‘located,’ as its appearances in 
the banking laws reveal, . . . is a chameleon word; its meaning depends on the 
context in and purpose for which it is used.”). 
 53. Id. at 316 (citations omitted). 
 54. See id. at 319  
The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more 
legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and 
should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs through 
legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must 
constantly be guarded against.  
(quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of 
Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933)). 
 55. See id. at 316–17 (“[T]his Court’s reading of the venue provision in 
Bougas effectively aligned the treatment of national banks for venue purposes 
with the treatment of state banks and corporations.”). 
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bank.56 For diversity-jurisdiction purposes, an ordinary 
corporation is a citizen only of the state in which it is 
incorporated and the state of its principal place of business, at 
most two, and often just one, state.57 In contrast, if the word 
“located” in the national bank jurisdiction statute included all of 
a national bank’s branch offices, the bank would be a citizen of 
multiple states—in Wachovia’s case, sixteen states—thereby 
severely limiting a national bank’s access to federal court under 
diversity jurisdiction.58 
In other words, despite the Court’s explicit rejection of the 
argument that the venue statute and the jurisdiction statute 
were in pari materia, we can see Wachovia Bank as in some sense 
an application of the in pari materia doctrine.59 The Court 
effectively concluded that the two statutes both had a common 
policy rationale, treating national banks the same as (or, at least 
as similar as possible to) other corporations, and the word 
“located” was to be interpreted in both statutes to further that 
same policy goal.60 Of course, this meant that the word “located” 
meant different things in the two different statutes.61 But still, 
this sort of reasoning is an attempt to create policy coherence 
                                                                                                     
 56. See id. at 319 (“The resulting Fourth Circuit decision rendered national 
banks singularly disfavored corporate bodies with regard to their access to 
federal courts.”). 
 57. See id. at 318 (“[A] corporation’s citizenship derives, for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes, from its State of incorporation and principal place of 
business. It is not deemed a citizen of every State in which it conducts business 
or is otherwise amenable to personal jurisdiction.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
(2018))). 
 58. See id. at 317 (“[W]hile corporations ordinarily rank as citizens of at 
most 2 States, Wachovia, under the [Fourth Circuit’s] novel citizenship rule, 
would be a citizen of 16 States.”). 
 59. See NELSON, supra note 21, at 502. 
 60. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006) (“Reading 
§ 1348 in [the corporate citizenship] context, one would sensibly ‘locate’ a 
national bank for the very same purpose, i.e., a qualification for diversity 
jurisdiction in the State designated in its articles of association as its main 
office.”). 
 61. Compare id. at 318–19 (finding the bank was “located” only “in the 
State designated in its articles of association as its main office”), with Citizens & 
S. Nat’l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 42–45 (1977) (determining that for 
purposes of the venue statute, “located” meant all places in which a bank had 
branches). 
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across the two statutes—indeed, policy coherence between the 
two statutes and those involving other corporations as well, an 
even broader and deeper policy coherence—precisely what the in 
pari materia doctrine has long been used to do.62 Justice 
Ginsburg’s conclusion that the two statutes were not in pari 
materia reflected the framing of the application of the in pari 
materia doctrine in terms of linguistic coherence, not policy 
coherence. The assumption about how to apply the doctrine—that 
it required linguistic coherence, as the Fourth Circuit had  
held—thus shaped the logically preceding question, whether to 
invoke the doctrine at all. If the Court had accepted that one can 
apply the in pari materia doctrine as a tool of policy coherence, 
then it easily could have found the venue and jurisdiction 
statutes to be in pari materia and still come to the same result. 
And it could have done so without narrowing the contours of the 
concept of “subject matter” so much that venue and  
jurisdiction—two areas that surely must be within the same 
“subject matter”—end up being viewed as different “subject 
matters.” 
B. The Same-Subject Determination as an Instantiation of 
Coherence in Law 
At core, the in pari materia doctrine is based on an 
underlying principle, the notion that if two statutes are on the 
same subject, they must cohere, they must harmonize.63 One way 
to view the in pari materia doctrine then is as a pragmatic tool 
that courts can use to make sense of an area of law.64 
Framed in these terms, it is not difficult to see the doctrine 
as emblematic of a broader notion of pragmatism in legal 
interpretation. The underlying assumption is that the law should 
                                                                                                     
 62. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 63. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 252 (“[L]aws dealing with the 
same subject — being in pari materia . . . —should if possible be interpreted 
harmoniously.”). 
 64. See Newman Mem’l Hosp. v. Walton Constr. Co., 37 Kan. App. 2d 46, 68 
(2007) (describing the in pari materia as a “pragmatic kind of test”). 
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make sense;65 harmonizing within an area of law would thus 
simply be one way to make that area of law make more sense. 
Thought of through the lens of “making sense” of the law, we can 
see shades of modern-day Posnerian pragmatism.66 Indeed, we 
might even go further and see the in pari materia doctrine as an 
instantiation of Dworkinian coherence67 or the Legal Process 
school’s notion that judges who do statutory interpretation must 
fit new legislation into “the general fabric of the law.”68 This 
notion of coherence across law might be likened to T.S. Eliot’s 
famous essay on art and tradition:  
No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. 
His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his 
relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him 
alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among 
the dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely 
historical, criticism. The necessity that he shall conform, that 
he shall cohere, is not onesided; what happens when a new 
work of art is created is something that happens 
simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it. The 
existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, 
which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really 
new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete 
before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the 
supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if 
ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, 
values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted; 
and this is conformity between the old and the new.69 
                                                                                                     
 65. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 252 (“[In pari materia] rests on 
two sound principles: (1) that the body of law should make sense, and (2) that it 
is the responsibility of the courts, within the permissible meanings of the text, 
to make it so.”). 
 66. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY 59–96 (2003). 
 67. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 19 (1986) (“[J]udges should 
construct a statute so as to make it conform as closely as possible to principles of 
justice assumed elsewhere in the law.” (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189 
(N.Y. 1889))); see generally POSNER, supra note 66. 
 68. See 4 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1416 (Tent. ed. 1958) 
(referring to “the mode of fitting the statute into the general fabric of the law”). 
 69. T.S. ELIOT, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in SELECTED ESSAYS 
13, 15 (2d ed. 1951). See also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 141–42 
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The idea of every piece of art both being shaped by the past and 
in turn, almost paradoxically, shaping the past is directly 
analogous to the idea that a statute “must be read,” as Judge 
Friendly once put it, “as part of a continuum,” affecting both the 
law that preceded it and the law that followed.70  
Coherence across statutes derives from the notion that every 
statute connects not just with other statutes on the same subject, 
but also with all other statutes as well as the common law. Its 
origins are in a broader jurisprudential and historical notion of 
coherence in the law, the notion that all law fits together in a 
single coherent mass.71 The in pari materia doctrine can thus be 
viewed as something broader than its characterization and 
categorization in the modern statutory-interpretation casebook: 
                                                                                                     
(similarly noting that T.S. Eliot’s ideas about poets both “interpret[ing] and 
through interpretation retrospectively shap[ing]” the tradition of poetry applies 
more broadly to the interpretation of all texts, including law). I am indebted to 
Professor Andrew Coan for drawing this analogy and directing me to the T.S. 
Eliot essay. 
 70. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of 
Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 196, 214 (1967) (“[W]e must consult not only what 
went before but what came after—the statute must be read as part of a 
continuum.”). All this would of course appear to be anathema to modern-day 
textualists, a point I will return to shortly. See infra Part IV.B.1. For now, 
though, the important point is that coherence in the law and harmonization of 
the law are the foundations of the in pari materia doctrine. See supra note 65 
and accompanying text.  
 71. The cites on this are innumerable. See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Coherence, 
Holism, and Interpretation: The Epistemic Foundations of Dworkin’s Legal 
Theory, 10 L. & PHIL. 383, 383 – 84 (1991) (“A legal system, [Dworkin] has 
repeatedly argued, comprises not only the settled or conventionally identifiable 
law, but also those norms which be shown to fit or cohere better with the best 
theory of the settled law.”); Ken Kress, Coherence and Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 639, 641 (1993) (“In his article Legal Formalism, Weinrib claims 
that his versions of conceptual coherence (and unity) are necessary for moral 
legitimacy.” (citing Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent 
Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 952 (1988))). Attorney Ohlendorf provides 
a recent example in the specific context of statutory interpretation. See John 
David Ohlendorf, Against Coherence in Statutory Interpretation, 90 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 735, 738 (2014) (“[C]ourts have been led both to undervalue Congress’s 
intent to impliedly repeal legislation and to place a thumb on the scale in favor 
of displacement of federal common law out of a desire to make the total body of 
law fit together as harmoniously as possible.”); cf. Krishnakumar, supra note 2, 
at 238–41 (describing what the author refers to as “legal-landscape coherence” 
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, contrasting it with “statute-specific 
coherence”).  
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Seen through this lens, the in pari materia doctrine is thus not 
just a species of what Professor Popkin refers to as “statutory 
patterns”72 or what Professor Eskridge and co-authors refer to as 
“interpretation in light of other statutes”73 or as a “corollary” to 
the Whole Act Rule.74 Rather, the in pari materia doctrine can be 
viewed as an example of the jurisprudential notion that all law is 
part of one coherent whole, that all statutes and the common law 
work together. 
Seen through this lens then, the in pari materia doctrine 
draws lines that determine, within the larger mass of law, those 
sub-categories of law that really should cohere; perhaps it is 
unrealistic to make all law cohere, the argument might go,75 but 
judges should at least do so within the confines of a single 
“subject matter.” Importantly though, if this were indeed the 
right way of thinking about the in pari materia doctrine, the 
doctrine’s goal would be coherence—within the “subject matter,” 
to be sure, but coherence nonetheless. Even in this more limited 
sense, then, this goal has a Dworkinian feel to it and bears little 
resemblance to what either subjective intentionalists or 
textualists purport to seek—“Congressional intent” for 
intentionalists or objective linguistic meaning for textualists. But 
for those from the Legal Process School, one might see coherence 
within a subject matter as simply a manifestation of Hart and 
Sacks’ idea of “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable goals 
reasonably”:76 We might assume, though without any specific 
                                                                                                     
 72. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL 
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 812–85 (5th ed. 2009) (addressing in pari 
materia doctrine in chapter entitled “Statutory Patterns”); see also William D. 
Popkin, Foreword: Nonjudicial Statutory Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 301 (1990). 
 73. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1066 (4th ed. 2007) (addressing 
in pari materia doctrine in section entitled “Interpretation in Light of Other 
Statutes”); see also NELSON, supra note 21, at 486 (same). 
 74. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 677 (including West Virginia University 
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey in section of “Whole Act Rule” and its corollaries). For a 
discussion of the Whole Act Rule, see infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 75. See generally, e.g., Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, 
Herbert and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 
(2000). 
 76. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
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evidence, that coherence between two statutes that are in pari 
materia is what the legislature wants, policy sense rather than 
policy nonsense.77 This act of harmonization would of course often 
entail some imaginative reconstruction,78 since there will usually 
not be any explicit evidence of legislative intent. Still, either with 
an assumption of legislative reasonableness or a view about a 
robust judicial role, one could treat the in pari materia doctrine 
as a modern-day vestige of this historical notion of coherence in 
the law: To determine whether two statutes are in pari materia is 
simply to ask whether those two statutes belong together in a 
single subcategory of the law that, as a normative matter, ought 
to cohere. 
As the world becomes more complex and law itself increases 
in complexity, answering this question might become more 
difficult, and the answers might change. For example, it could be 
that as law expands, the subcategories become more and more 
finely divided. For example, perhaps in the early nineteenth 
century, the federal law of telecommunications (i.e., the law 
regulating mail delivery) would have been in the same category 
as, and should thus cohere with, the federal law of transportation 
(the law regulating federal “roads,” which were often postal 
roads).79 Perhaps even in the late nineteenth century, some 
aspects of the law of telecommunications—say the laws 
regulating the telegraph — should cohere with some aspects of the 
law of transportation—the laws regulating the railroads—since 
                                                                                                     
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (noting that courts should “assume, unless 
the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of 
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”). 
 77. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND 
THEIR INTERPRETATION 104 (2010) (“One reason for a court’s interpreting laws to 
foster a coherent code is the assumption that the legislature would have wanted 
it to do so.”). 
 78. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and 
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“I suggest that the task for 
the judge called upon to interpret a statute is best described as one of 
imaginative reconstruction.” (emphasis added)). This approach to statutory 
interpretation asks an interpreter to “imagine how [members of the enacting 
legislature] would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.” Id. 
 79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 7 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
establish post offices and post roads . . . .”). 
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telegraph lines were often built along railroad lines.80 Yet, it was 
probably no longer necessary for the entire field of 
telecommunications law to cohere with the entire field of 
transportation law. Indeed, in the United States, with its private 
ownership of telegraph and its public ownership of the postal 
service, it might not even have been necessary for the entire field 
of telecommunications law to cohere.81 And of course by the early 
twenty-first century, with the law of transportation, at least 
broadly speaking, including federal laws regulating motor vehicle 
safety and fuel economy and local laws regulating traffic flow, it 
is difficult to make a case that these laws ought to cohere with 
telecommunications law writ large—or, as we now say, 
“cyberlaw”—including the rules of e-commerce or net neutrality.82 
These are viewed as completely different “subject matters” 
because of increased complexity in the world. In effect, a single 
“subject matter” has subdivided into many. Indeed, even within 
what could arguably be viewed as telecommunications law, it 
would be hard to argue that all of such laws need to cohere—say 
the applicability of state sales tax laws to out-of-state online 
retailers versus the applicability of copyright law to uploaded 
YouTube videos.83 Amidst this constant change, in law and in the 
                                                                                                     
 80. See RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION 164–67 (2010) (discussing 1875 
National Telegraph Act and 1879 Butler Amendment allowing railroad 
companies to own and operate telegraph lines along their rights-of-way). 
 81. See, e.g., Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office 
and the Birth of Communication Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 577–84 (2007) 
(describing differences in privacy protections between postal and telegraphic 
communications). 
 82. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012) (instructing the Environmental 
Protection Agency to regulate motor vehicle fuel economy standards), and CAL. 
VEH. CODE § 21101 (Deering 1998) (providing for local regulation of highways), 
with Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 
2003, Pub. L. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (imposing “limitations and 
penalties on the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic mail via the 
Internet”), and In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311 
(2017) (rescinding net neutrality). 
 83. Compare South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099–2100 
(2018) overturning Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (holding that 
states may impose a sales tax on internet sales by out-of-state retailers with no 
physical presence in the state), with Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 
19, 37 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s 
intermediary liability provisions to YouTube videos). 
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world, there can thus be no Archimedean point for determining 
when two statutes are in pari materia. 
Key, though, is that, seen through this lens, the question 
that Step Zero of the in pari materia doctrine asks is a normative 
question about whether two statutes ought to cohere. It has 
nothing to do with specific legislative intent or the objective 
meaning of words. On its face, then, the same-subject 
determination bears little connection with either the 
intentionalist or the textualist modality in statutory 
interpretation. 
C. The Same-Subject Determination as a Delineation of the 
“Context” Surrounding Statutory Language 
While we can thus think of the in pari materia doctrine as 
simply a hollowed-out relic of the idea of all law as one coherent 
jurisprudential mass, we can also look at it from the smallest 
units of law outwards rather than from the mass of law inward. 
Rather than thinking of a theoretical construct of all law 
subdivided into those categories that should be internally 
coherent, we can instead think of the in pari materia doctrine 
through the lens of the specific text of a statute, asking what else 
other than that text can be used as evidence of the statute’s 
meaning. In other words, we can think of the same-subject 
determination as drawing boundaries around the statutory text: 
within those boundaries lies the statute’s “context,” which the 
judge may of course consider when interpreting the statute.84  
To illustrate the point, consider a simple, well-known 
example from the statutory-interpretation canon: the use of the 
Whole Act Rule when interpreting the words “labor” and “service” 
in the statute at issue in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States.85 In Holy Trinity, the Court had to determine whether a 
                                                                                                     
 84. Cf. 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 51.01 at 172 – 73 (6th ed. 2000) (“The principle that statutes in pari materia 
should be construed together is a variation of the principle that all parts of a 
statute should be construed together and its corollary that an amendment and 
the unchanged portion of the original act should be construed together.”). 
 85. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).  
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church that had hired and then prepaid the transportation costs 
of a minister, E. Walpole Warren, to come from England to New 
York violated a statutory prohibition on “assist[ing] or 
encourag[ing] the importation or migration[] of any alien to 
perform labor or service of any kind.”86 The court quickly 
“conceded that the act of the [church] is within the letter of this 
section, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service, 
and implies labor on the one side with compensation on the 
other.”87 But as many commentators have pointed out, the terms 
“labor” and “service” could have multiple meanings, and it is not 
difficult to find dictionary meanings of the terms that would limit 
their reach to manual work.88 If so, “the relation of rector to his 
church” would, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, not be “one of 
service” and would not “impl[y] labor.” After all, the term “labor” 
is etymologically connected with the term “laborer,” and no one 
would view Reverend Warren as a “laborer.”89 And the term 
“service” is etymologically connected with the term “servant,” 
which again is a far cry from anyone’s idea of a minister.90 Of 
course, these are by no means the only possible definitions of 
“labor” and “service,” but they are plausible. It is thus possible in 
the abstract to argue, contrary to Justice Brewer’s concession 
                                                                                                     
 86. Id. at 458 (quoting Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 40 
(2016) [hereinafter MISREADING LAW] (noting that the “prototypical” meaning of 
“labor” would have been manual labor); Victoria F. Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain 
Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 998 (2011) [hereinafter Two Kinds] (arguing 
that the Court dismissed a clear plain meaning in favor of Congressional 
intent); SOLAN supra note 77, at 54–55 (distinguishing between the “ordinary” 
meaning, which would be manual labor, and the broader “definitional” 
meaning); Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, 
Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 924–30 
(2000) (in support of a more limited definition of “labor” in Holy Trinity, noting 
that “labor” as used in Chinese Exclusion Act meant manual labor). 
 89. See, e.g., Labor, 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 559 (2d. ed. 1989) 
(“labor” defined as “Bodily or mental exertion, particularly when difficulty, 
painful, or compulsory; (hard) work; toil, esp. physical toil”); id. (“laborer” 
defined as “[a] person who performs physical labour, usually as a means of 
employment; a manual worker, esp. one carrying out unskilled work”). 
 90. See, e.g., Service, 15 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 34 (2d. ed. 1989) 
(“service” defined as “[t]he condition of being a servant; the fact of serving a 
master”). 
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“that the act of the [church] is within the letter” of the law, that 
the terms are ambiguous as to whether they apply to the church’s 
hiring of its pastor: one possible meaning of “labor” and “service” 
would encompass what the Court referred to as “brain toilers” 
such as Reverend Warren, and another possible meaning would 
exclude them. Where terms are ambiguous and an interpreter 
must choose among different possible definitions, most judges, 
even some modern-day textualists, are willing to turn to 
statutory purpose. Given the evidence about the statute’s 
purpose, it wouldn’t have been hard to argue that limiting “labor” 
and “service” to their manual-work definitions was appropriate. 
But when confronted with such an approach to 
interpretation, virtually every first-year law student can see the 
flaw in the reasoning. But the flaw is found not in the words 
“labor” and “service,” nor even in Section 1 of the Act91—the 
statutory prohibition—at all. Rather, the flaw in arguing for 
narrow definitions of “labor” and “service” is that elsewhere—in 
Section 5 of the Act92—the statute includes exceptions for “actors, 
artists, lecturers, [and] singers,” exceptions that—or, so the 
argument goes—simply would not have been necessary if “labor” 
and “service” were meant to be limited to the narrow definition of 
manual work.93 This is of course a straightforward negative 
implication argument from context: The context surrounding 
Section 1 of the statute—namely, the exceptions in Section  
5—tells us something about the most likely meaning of the words 
“labor” and “service” in Section 1.94 But of course, one reason 
context matters here is that virtually everyone agrees that 
Section 1 and Section 5 must cohere, that it would be wrong to 
interpret the words “labor” and “service” in Section 1 without 
taking into account Section 5 and its exceptions.95 An interpreter 
                                                                                                     
 91. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332. 
 92. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 5, 23 Stat. 332. 
 93. But see MISREADING LAW, supra note 88, at 46 (arguing that the 
exceptions support the view that “labor” was meant to be limited to manual 
labor because Congress meant to clarify, not limit the broad category).  
 94. See Two Kinds, supra note 88, at 998 (noting that the court used the 
Section 5 exceptions to further demonstrate that Congress intended the statute 
to mean “labor” and “service” in a broad sense of employment, rather than 
manual labor). 
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seeks to harmonize these two sections, and to do so, concludes 
that the inclusion of “actors, artists, lecturers, [and] singers” as 
exceptions listed in Section 5 would be superfluous if the terms 
“labor” and “service” in Section 1 were limited to manual work.96  
This argument likely appeals to both intentionalists and 
textualists. A subjective intentionalist would say that ensuring 
coherence between Sections 1 and 5 makes sense because the 
drafter of Section 1 also drafted Section 5—they are, after all, 
part of the same statute adopted at the same time.97 The 
textualist would likewise say Section 5 is crucial to 
understanding the meaning of Section 1 but would focus on the 
objective meaning that the “objectively reasonable” reader would 
glean from the text.98 But why exactly does Section 5 matter at 
all to the textualist when interpreting Section 1? The answer is 
that the textualist expects the objective reader to look at and 
consider statutory context.99 The objective reader is expected to 
know what is usually referred to as the Whole Act Rule (or at 
least some variation on it—more on this point below).100 She or he 
                                                                                                     
 95. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 167 (“Sir Edward Coke 
explained the [Whole Act] canon in 1628: ‘[I]t is the most natural and genuine 
exposition of a statute to construe one part of the statute by another part of the 
same statute, for that best expresseth the meaning of the makers.” (quoting 1 
EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, OR A 
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 728 (14th ed. 1791))). 
 96. Notice that this is distinct from an expressio unius argument based on 
the fact that ministers are not included in the list of exceptions.  
 97. But see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory 
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 934–35 (2013) (noting 
that the “rule against superfluities” does not comport with how most drafters 
understand the meaning of texts because drafters often include redundancy to 
satisfy audiences other than judicial interpreters). 
 98. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 170–73 (describing 
the presumption of consistent usage which presumes that when a word is used 
more than once in a text, the meanings are consistent). 
 99. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 167 (“Context is a primary 
determinant of meaning. A legal instrument typically contains many 
interrelated parts that make up the whole. The entirety of the document thus 
provides the context for each of its parts.”). 
 100. See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of 
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 
(2005) (discussing the Whole Act Rule and its application in a variety of cases in 
depth). Justice Scalia referred to the Whole Act Rule as the “whole-text canon.” 
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knows that you have to look beyond a specific statutory provision 
to understand that provision, that you need to read the entire 
statute.101 The argument might on first blush seem circular, and 
at some level it is: a reader who goes straight to the dictionary 
and finds the manual-work definitions of “labor” and “service” 
and interprets Section 1 on that basis alone simply does not 
understand enough about statutes to be deemed the appropriate 
objective reader. 
From the textualist’s perspective, then, one important 
preliminary consideration is understanding what the objective 
reader should know.102 Or, more precisely, what else other than 
the immediate text the objective reader must look to in order to 
understand the meaning of that text? What is within the relevant 
context that an objective interpreter should be expected to look 
at? My example from Holy Trinity103 is easy: there, no one doubts 
the relevance of Section 5 for interpreting Section 1. 
As I will explain in more detail in Part III, though, this point 
becomes crucial when we seek to determine whether two statutes 
are in pari materia. For a textualist, one key to determining 
when one statute is in pari materia with a second should be 
determining when an objective reader would or should look to 
that second statute. While this question does not answer itself by 
any means, it does create a more objective approach to the 
problem. It also serves textualism’s goals of cabining judicial 
discretion and its rule-of-law value of fair notice. As we will see 
when I address some examples in Part III, this approach 
precludes the interpreter who might claim textualism’s mantle 
                                                                                                     
See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 101. See, e.g., Dig. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 776 (2018) 
(determining that the definitions section of a statute must control when 
interpreting statutory language); accord Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Comtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700–01 (1995) (looking to a provision in 
Endangered Species Act that authorized Secretary of Interior to issue permits 
for takings to help interpret the word “harm” in the definition of the word “take” 
in the same statute); id. at 722–23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (similarly looking to 
other provisions in the Endangered Species Act to interpret the same word). 
 102. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 16 (“In their full context, words 
mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were 
written . . . .”). 
 103. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
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from engaging in a freewheeling romp through the United States 
Code to find helpful references to make arguments based on, say, 
the presumption of consistent usage or, as in Holy Trinity, based 
on negative implications such as the presumption against 
superfluity. As I explained earlier, what textualists are likely to 
do once they determine that two statutes are in pari materia is 
different from what subjective internationalists are likely to do,104 
but that is of less concern to me here. Here, I am focused simply 
on the question of how to determine whether two statutes are in 
pari materia. 
Before turning to some examples, though, I want to touch 
briefly on the question of whether it makes sense for two statutes 
ever to be deemed in pari materia. Why should an interpreter 
ever look outside the four corners of the specific statute being 
interpreted? The answer is obvious to anyone who has done any 
interpretation, including textualists:105 Law does not spring forth 
into being like Athena from the head of Zeus.106 All law—indeed, 
all language—is painted on a pre-existing canvas that consists of 
not just background principles of how to interpret,107 and not just 
ordinary uses of language, but also pre-existing law. The in pari 
materia doctrine is just one example, then, of a broader set of 
questions about how an interpreter is to grapple with the rest of 
the law. Everyone—textualist and intentionalist alike — considers 
the fact that a statute is not an isolated document. The question 
the in pari materia doctrine raises is a subset of the broader 
question of what else—in particular, what other statutes—the 
interpreter should view as relevant context in the interpretive 
process. 108 
                                                                                                     
 104. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text; see also NELSON, supra 
note 21, at 487. 
 105. See, e.g., Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 608–17 (2018) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (textualist Justice looking outside four corners of 
statute to draw on history, context and canons of interpretation to interpret 
statutory language). 
 106. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 29 (1950) (detailing the birth of 
Athena from Zeus’s head). 
 107. See NELSON, supra note 21, at 1–5 (discussing background “principles of 
interpretation”). 
 108. I should be clear that I am distinguishing between drawing on another 
statute as evidence of the use of the English language and drawing on another 
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III. Interstatutory Cross-Referencing and the Textualist 
Modality109 in Statutory Interpretation 
A. Textualism, Linguistic Theory, and the Objective Reader 
Textualism is an approach to statutory interpretation that, 
as its name suggests, focuses on the text of a statute as the 
principal—in many cases, sole—factor in interpreting a 
statute.110 Textualism comes in lots of related flavors, but the 
                                                                                                     
statute as evidence of the specific meaning of the statute being interpreted. The 
in pari materia doctrine uses another statute as evidence of the specific meaning 
of a statute and not merely as evidence of the use of the English language. If 
used as evidence of the way language is used generally, cross-referencing some 
other statute would be no different from citing Shakespeare or Dickens or the 
Bible. Compare Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–31 (1998) (using 
dictionaries, the Bible, famous writings, recent media coverage and case law to 
demonstrate the meaning of “carry” in the context of firearms), with id. at  
143–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the Court, I do not think dictionaries, 
surveys of press reports, or the Bible tell us, dispositively, what ‘carries’ means 
embedded in [the statute].”). Such a use could presumably be subject to work on 
the corpus of language that has become all the rage in interpretation these days. 
See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 
YALE L.J. 788, 795 (2018) (“Corpus linguists study language through data 
derived from large bodies—corpora—of naturally occurring language.”). But, the 
in pari materia doctrine’s use of cross-referenced statutes is a different 
phenomenon. It relies on the similarity in subject matter and the fact that the 
cross-reference is another statute, not just some other random use of language, 
to argue that the cross-referenced, related statute is better evidence of specific 
usage in the particular statutory context, rather than evidence of general 
linguistic usage. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. I am indebted to 
Professor Christopher Robertson for helping me clarify this important 
distinction.  
 109. I borrow the term “modality” here from the literature on constitutional 
interpretation. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF 
THE CONSTITUTION (1982) (describing six modalities of constitutional argument: 
historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical). It strikes me 
as a more apt term. Cf. John David Ohlendorf, Purposivism Outside Statutory 
Interpretation, 21 TEXAS REV. L. & POL. 235, 270 (2016) (“The idea is that a 
variety of considerations—text, structure, consequences, precedent, deeply held 
values — all get folded into a robust, wide-ranging balancing process, with the 
ultimate contribution of each modality to the final conclusion left ‘to the realm of 
judgment.’” (citing Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 167 (2008))). 
 110. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 16 (“Textualism, in its purest 
form, begins and ends with what the text says and fairly implies.”). 
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core commonality that all textualists share is that the text comes 
first and foremost and that the language of the statute must take 
precedence over other evidence of either Congress’s subjective 
intent or its purpose.111 While textualists thus generally refuse to 
rely on either legislative history or any alleged purpose 
unexpressed in enacted statutory text, many will look to 
normative or substantive canons (such as the rule of lenity112 or 
presumption against the abrogation of sovereign immunity113) 
where such a canon might be relevant. The normative canons, 
though, are not the core of the textualist modality. Rather, the 
core of the textualist modality is to use linguistic tools to 
determine what legal theorists refer to as the statute’s 
“communicative content.”114 Importantly, textualists often 
interpret statutes by determining the “plain meaning” of a 
                                                                                                     
 111. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 18  
Nontextualism, which frees the judge from interpretive scruple, 
comes in various forms. Perhaps the nontextualists’ favorite 
substitute for text is purpose. . . . [P]urposivism . . . facilitates 
departure from text in several ways. Where purpose is king, text is 
not—so the purposivist goes around or behind the words of the 
controlling text to achieve what he believes to be the provision’s 
purpose. Moreover, purpose is taken to mean the purpose of the 
author (the legislature or private drafter) — which means that all 
sorts of nontextual material such as legislative history . . . becomes 
relevant to revise the fairest objective meaning of the text. The most 
destructive (and most alluring) feature of purposivism is 
manipulability. 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 523 (2008) (using the 
rule of lenity to interpret a statutory ambiguity). 
 113. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29–45 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Pennsylvania’s abrogation of sovereign 
immunity under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act). 
 114. See Richard H. Fallon, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its 
Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235,  
1266 – 67 (2015) (“[Professor] Solum equates the centrally relevant sense of 
linguistic meaning with what he calls ‘communicative content,’ which he regards 
as a function of semantic meaning and the contextual facts that give rise to 
what philosophers of language call ‘pragmatic enrichment.’” (citing Lawrence B. 
Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 
484 (2013))). 
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statute’s language based on how an objective reader would 
understand the text.115 
The textualist’s claim to reject subjective intent and focus 
only on an “objectified intent”116 is an attempt to shift the focus of 
statutory interpretation from writer to reader, to draw the 
distinction between, in linguists’ terms, “‘speaker’s meaning’ and 
‘sentence meaning’ (or ‘expression meaning’).”117 As Professor 
Solum articulates the distinction, “speaker’s meaning should be 
analyzed in terms of a speaker’s (or author’s) intentions.”118 In 
contrast, “[t]he sentence meaning (or ‘expression meaning’) of an 
utterance is the conventional semantic meaning of the words and 
phrases that combine to form the utterance.”119 The idea of 
“sentence meaning” is premised on the notion that “words and 
expressions have standard meanings—the meanings that are 
conventional given relevant linguistic practices.”120 In short, 
textualism aims to capture what the linguists call “sentence 
meaning.” Traditionally, textualists viewed the process of 
determining meaning through the lens of what Justice Scalia 
referred to as “objectified intent,” and this process was thought to 
be based on the perspective of the statutory reader.121 
B. Textualism’s Rationales and the Same-Subject Determination 
As either a theory or a modality of statutory interpretation, 
textualism itself provides no inherent answer to the question of 
                                                                                                     
 115. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 116. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (stating that “objectified intent” is 
“the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law”); see 
also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 33 (“The interpretive approach we 
endorse is that of the ‘fair reading’: determining the application of a governing 
text to the given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent 
in the language, would have understood the test at the time it was issued.”). 
 117. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 489–90 (2013) (citing PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY 
OF WORDS 3–143 (1989)).  
 118.  Id. at 490.  
 119. Id. at 491.  
 120. Id. 
 121.  See supra note 116. 
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when it is appropriate to rely on one statute to interpret 
another.122 When a textualist decides it is appropriate, the 
textualist will of course use linguistic canons, such as the 
presumptions of consistent usage or meaningful variation, across 
the two statutes.123 Yet, as we saw in Wachovia Bank, even 
textualists will treat the appropriateness of relying on a second 
statute to interpret a statute as an in pari materia question.124  
In practice, then, everyone—including textualists —
 understands that the so-called Whole Code Rule in statutory 
interpretation, if taken literally, is far too broad to work 
consistently in practice: There is no way to create complete 
linguistic consistency across the entire United States Code.125 
The array of different laws in the U.S. Code is just too large to 
demand linguistic coherence across the entire code.126 On the 
                                                                                                     
 122.  Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read 
a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 477 (2012) (explaining that 
textualists do rely on, among other things, other statutes in the interpretive 
process).  
 123.  See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 
419, 434–36 (2005) (explaining that textualists employ linguistic canons as they 
interpret statutes).  
 124.  See supra Part II.A; see also Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 
422–23 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J.) (determining the meaning of a statute 
through the canon of in pari materia), rev’d, 546 U.S. 303 (2006). Judge Luttig, a 
prominent textualist, wrote the Fourth Circuit opinion finding the two statutes 
were in pari materia. Id. at 415. Justice Scalia joined the unanimous Supreme 
Court decision finding that the two statutes were not in pari materia. See 
Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006). Neither of them thought the 
word “located” necessarily had to have the same meaning in both statutes. See 
id. at 316–19 (discussing whether “located” should have the same meaning in 
both statutes); Wachovia Bank, 388 F.3d at 422–24 (same). Both recognized that 
at least sometimes statutes do not have to cohere linguistically. See Wachovia 
Bank, 546 U.S. at 314 (“Congress’ use of the two terms may be best explained as 
a coincidence of statutory codification.”); Wachovia Bank, 388 F.3d at 422–23 
(addressing variety of circumstances in which words in different statutes do not 
cohere linguistically). 
 125.  See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 122, at 477 (discussing the decision costs of 
interpreting a statute in the context of the entire U.S. Code); cf. Buzbee, supra 
note 1, at 232, 237–39 (arguing that allowing courts to reference statues 
throughout the code provides judges too much discretion).  
 126.  See Gluck, supra note 26, at 202–04 (explaining that features of the 
legislative process “pose a perhaps insurmountable obstacle” to the assumption 
that linguistic consistency exists “across an entire statute or . . . even across 
multiple statutes”). This may be one reason why the Dictionary Act, the U.S. 
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other hand, everyone—including textualists—will at times 
engage in interstatutory cross-referencing, thereby recognizing 
that the context for interpretation sometimes includes statutes 
other than the one being interpreted.127 This thus leads to the 
fundamental question that Step Zero of the in pari materia 
doctrine raises: how should a textualist judge determine whether 
the statute to be interpreted—let us call it “Statute A”—is “on the 
same subject” as the statute being compared—let us call it 
“Statute B”?  
The question then is, how should a textualist draw the 
demarcation lines of subject matter in a principled way? We can 
look to the animating rationales underlying textualism, as those 
reasons can help us understand how to determine what 
constitutes the same subject. Or, at the very least, how to 
determine what factors we might use when inquiring as to 
whether two statutes are on the same subject. 
Textualists rely on several rationales for textualism, 
although these rationales tend to be used for specific aspects of 
the debate between textualists and their opponents, rather than 
as a full-throttled defense of textualism per se: some are used to 
defend “plain meaning,”128 others are used to oppose the use of 
legislative history,129 and others are used to defend the use of 
linguistic canons like the presumption of consistent usage or 
                                                                                                     
Code’s definition section, provides that its definitions apply “unless the context 
indicates otherwise.” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); see, e.g., Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 
506 U.S. 194, 199–200 (1993) (employing the “context” clause in the Dictionary 
Act to interpret a statutory term contrary to the Dictionary Act definition). As 
we will see, whether to aspire for consistency across the entire U.S. Code 
remains a crucial question when addressing the broader question of 
interstatutory cross-referencing. See infra Part III.D. 
 127.  See Wachovia Bank, 388 F.3d at 422 (employing interstatutory 
cross-referencing through the canon of in pari materia). Again, let me 
emphasize that I refer here to relying on another statute based on the notion 
that the specific usage in that other statute provides better evidence of the 
meaning of the statute’s language than evidence of English language usage 
generally. See supra note 108 (discussing this distinction).  
 128.  See David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1565, 1565 (1997) (“The basic idea—that the interpretation of a statute begins 
by considering the ordinary meaning of its words—seems obviously right.”).  
 129.  See Manning, supra note 123, at 420 (“[M]any textualist judges 
typically refuse to treat legislative history as ‘authoritative’ . . . .”). 
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substantive canons like the rule of lenity.130 Broadly speaking 
though, the principal arguments fall into four categories: (1) text 
as enacted law;131 (2) decision costs/efficiency;132 (3) judicial 
constraint;133 and (4) notice.134  
The first two rationales provide little help in determining 
whether two statutes are in pari materia. First, the argument 
that only the text is enacted law does not help determine whether 
two statutes are on the same subject. For some textualist judges 
and scholars, the argument has some purchase on the 
appropriateness of using legislative history.135 For many, it also 
                                                                                                     
 130.  See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13 (including not only 
“semantic” and “syntactic” canons, but also “expected-meaning” canons such as 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, “government-structuring” canons 
such as the presumption against federal preemption, and “private-right” canons 
such as the rule of lenity). 
 131.  See, e.g., John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1287, 1304–07 (2010) (explaining a shift in textualism that resulted in it 
having a “more formal, constitutionally grounded cast”).  
 132.  See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (arguing that judges 
should generally stick close to text because of uncertainty and bounded 
rationality).  
 133.  See SCALIA, supra note 116, at 17–18 (explaining that a non-textualist 
approach allows judges to interpret a statute based on “their own objectives and 
desires”). A variation of this argument is that textualism creates more 
predictable interpretive results, which in turn facilitates better legislative 
drafting, a variation on what Hart and Sacks famously referred to as the 
“flagellant theory of statutory interpretation.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF 
LAW 91 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). There remains 
an open question as to whether the practice of textualism, with its multiple 
linguistic and substantive canons, actually does a better job at limiting judicial 
discretion than competing theories. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Change, 
Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon 
Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2018) (based on 
an extensive study of the Roberts Court’s use of interpretive canons, concluding 
that predictability and stability cannot justify use of the canons). 
 134.  See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 352 
(2005) (explaining that textualists focus on the reasonable meaning of the text 
due to the belief that “people should not be held to legal requirements of which 
they lacked fair notice”). 
 135.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory 
Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 90–91 (2017) (arguing that the use of 
legislative history is “illegitimate” because it is “insufficient to constitute 
legislation in our system of governance”). 
INTERSTATUTORY INTERPRETATION 211 
dovetails with the idea, rooted in public choice theory, that 
legislation is the product of interest group politics and that judges 
should honor the bargain embedded in the text.136 Neither of 
these ideas provides help on the question here. All statutes are 
enacted law, and, if public-choice theory reflects the legislative 
process, all are the product of interest group politics. This fact 
tells us little about the same-subject determination because that 
determination is about the relationships among statutes, since it 
asks which statutes are “on the same subject” (and thus which 
statutes can be relied on as a source of interpretive aid). While 
the argument that only the text is enacted law may bear on the 
relevance of legislative history, it has nothing to say about the 
same-subject determination. 
Second, although the argument that textualism reduces 
decision costs (an argument that probably has far more purchase 
in the trial courts than in the U.S. Supreme Court)137 does have 
something to say about the proper scope of the same-subject 
determination, it has little to say about the content of that 
determination. Reducing decision costs as a rationale would 
support a more limited in pari materia doctrine, perhaps even the 
elimination of the doctrine altogether. After all, the further afield 
an interpreter may look for aid in interpreting a statute, the 
greater the potential costs of decision. This rationale for 
textualism favors plain meaning and a focus on the four corners 
of the document,138 but with as limited a conception of the 
relevant “document” as possible: the further afield the interpreter 
may go, the more context the interpreter may consider, and thus 
                                                                                                     
 136.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of 
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 296–97 
(1988) (noting that Easterbrookian textualism embodies public choice ideals and 
“provides one useful way to limit rent-seeking legislation”). 
 137.  See Bruhl, supra note 122, at 470–73 (positing that resource disparities 
among different levels of courts should affect the appropriateness of using 
different techniques of statutory interpretation); see also Anuj C. Desai, 
Heterogeneity, Legislative History, and the Cost of Litigation: A Brief Comment 
on Bruhl’s “Hierarchy and Heterogeneity”, 2013 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 15 (2013) 
(noting that to evaluate Bruhl’s normative claim, we first need answers to 
certain empirical questions). 
 138.  See VERMEULE, supra note 132, at 4 (asserting that judges should “stick 
close to the surface-level or literal meaning of clear and specific texts”). 
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the higher the decision costs. But the decision-costs rationale 
does not help an interpreter decide whether two statutes are in 
fact in pari materia. If we are going to have an in pari materia 
doctrine at all, textualist judges need tools for determining when 
two statutes are “on the same subject.” 
Third, the argument that textualism limits judicial discretion 
can help us understand the in pari materia question in a limited 
sense, but it is one that is crucial to my proposed approach: if 
limiting judicial discretion is an important goal of statutory 
interpretation, it counsels for a more rule-like approach for 
determining what constitutes statutes on the same subject, 
rather than one based on standards. Rules tend to limit decision 
maker authority more than standards.139 Again though, as with 
the rationale from decision costs, the judicial-constraint 
argument for textualism does not tell us anything about what the 
content of the rule should be.140 
It is the final rationale for textualism though, the argument 
based on the principle of notice, that can help with the content of 
such a rule. Much of what drives textualism is the notion that it 
is simply unfair to regulate citizens without providing proper 
notice.141 Those subject to the law should know what the law is 
and should only be subject to the objective understanding of the 
law as promulgated and not to the subjective understanding or 
intentions of the legislators.142 
                                                                                                     
 139.  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22, 78 (1992) (“any rule reduces judicial discretion as compared 
with a standard”); Nelson, supra note 134, at 375 (“A more ‘rule-like’ principle or 
directive will itself incorporate some advance judgments . . . [,] generalizations 
that the implementing officials might think unfounded in a particular case, but 
that they are nonetheless supposed to accept.”).  
 140.  Professor William Buzbee has argued that an open-ended approach to 
statutory cross-referencing permits judges too much discretion. See Buzbee, 
supra note 1, at 232, 237–39. While I wholeheartedly agree, my point here is 
somewhat different. To the extent that any statutory cross-referencing is to be 
allowed, a rule-like approach will serve as more of a constraint than one based 
on standards.  
 141.  See Nelson, supra note 134, at 352 (stating that textualists 
“emphasiz[e] . . . that people should not be held to legal requirements of which 
they lacked fair notice”).  
 142.  See id. (explaining the connection between textualism’s focus on fair 
notice and the importance of objective understanding).  
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Many textualists view this important value as crucial to the 
relationship between lawmakers and citizens.143 On this view, 
statutory interpretation must emphasize plain meaning because 
such an approach allows the ordinary person to understand the 
law.144 It is thus the reader of the law whose understanding 
prevails over the lawmakers’.145 Textualists’ focus on the reader 
of the law rather than the drafter of the law is imbued too with 
what I elsewhere refer to as textualism’s Benthamite strand:146 it 
                                                                                                     
 143.  See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)  
I likewise cannot join the Court’s discussion of the (as usual, 
inconclusive) legislative history. Relying on the statement of a single 
Member of Congress or an unvoted-upon (and for all we know unread) 
Committee Report to expand a statute beyond the limits its text 
suggests is always a dubious enterprise. And consulting those 
incunabula with an eye to making criminal what the text would 
otherwise permit is even more suspect. Indeed, it is not unlike the 
practice of Caligula, who reportedly “wrote his laws in a very small 
character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually 
to ensnare the people.”  
(citations omitted). See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (making the same point, but referring to 
Nero, not Caligula: “It is said that one of emperor Nero’s nasty practices was to 
post his edicts high on the columns so that they would be harder to read and 
easier to transgress.”); SCALIA, supra note 116, at 17 (after criticizing the view 
that the meaning of a law should be determined by what the lawgiver meant, 
stating, “That seems to me one step worse than the trick the emperor Nero was 
said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not 
easily be read”). Justice Scalia’s historical claim about Caligula likely comes 
from Blackstone. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46 (14th ed. 1803) 
(noting that law must be notified “in the most public and perspicuous manner; 
not like Caligula who (according to Dio Cassius) wrote his laws in a very small 
character, and hung them upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the 
people”). 
 144.  See Scalia, supra note 143, at 1179 (“Rudimentary justice requires that 
those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”).  
 145.  See SCALIA, supra note 116, at 17 (explaining the importance of 
meaning as the ordinary reader would understand it rather than a lawmaker). 
 146.  See Anuj C. Desai, Textualism Step Zero (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (explaining the importance of 
Bentham’s ideas about simplicity in law); see also Dean Alfange, Jr., Jeremy 
Bentham and the Codification of Law, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 58, 61 (1969) (noting 
that Bentham “was dedicated to the belief that justice, order, certainty and 
simple procedure could be implanted permanently into any legal system through 
the adoption of a comprehensive but concise legal code”). 
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is the ordinary person’s understanding of the text that must 
prevail over the unknowable and, even if knowable, unadopted 
legislative intent.147 
Textualists understand though that such a focus on the 
statutory reader requires the positing of an “objectively 
reasonable” person, from whose position the statute must be 
understood.148 Determining who exactly that “objectively 
reasonable” person is may not, however, be a simple task.149 
Professor Nelson has, with characteristic insight, used a slightly 
different term from the term “objectively reasonable person” to 
describe a textualist’s typical statutory reader: Nelson refers to 
the “‘appropriately informed’ interpreter.”150 The use of the term 
“appropriately informed” interpreter rather than “objectively 
reasonable” person allows for a subtle shift away from the 
ordinary person as objective reader, at least (or so I will argue) as 
to certain types of laws.151 
Indeed, in a world where law is such a complex phenomenon, 
the notice rationale by itself simply cannot answer all questions 
of statutory interpretation.152 As most textualists recognize, at 
least implicitly, much law is not aimed at all citizens.153 Thus, to 
                                                                                                     
 147.  See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 
115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 751–52 (2017) (explaining that Justice Scalia believed 
that a judge should rely on the enacted text over legislative intent). 
 148.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory 
Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 91–92 (2017) (explaining that the text’s 
meaning lies in the “reaction of the contemporaneous interpretive community”); 
cf. NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 131 (2019) (referring to 
“an ordinary English speaker familiar with the law’s usages”). 
 149.  See Nelson, supra note 134, at 357 (framing the analysis of who 
constitutes the appropriate reader). 
 150.  See id. at 353 (explaining that the “‘appropriately informed’ interpreter” 
is “someone who knows what interpreters are permitted to know and who will 
use that information for the purposes that interpreters are permitted to use it”). 
 151.  See infra Part III.C.2. 
 152.  See Easterbrook, supra note 148, at 82 (“[E]ven textualism . . . does not 
have an algorithm.”). 
 153.  Justice Gorsuch has explicitly claimed to be picking up Justice Scalia’s 
mantle, including on the question of the ordinary person as a reader of law. See, 
e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1123–35 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring in part) (adopting Justice Scalia’s articulation of the notice rationale 
for textualism); Neil M. Gorsuch, Law’s Irony, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 
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understand how the notice principle might shed light on the in 
pari materia question requires a deeper understanding of, using 
Nelson’s term, who the “appropriately informed” interpreter is. 
Put another way, to answer the in pari materia question, a 
textualist must first identify the statute’s audience.154  
At core, then, to effectuate the notice principle requires an 
understanding of a statute’s audience, or to borrow Professor 
William Blatt’s phrase, the statute’s “interpretive community.”155 
This insight can help us understand how to draw lines for 
purposes of the in pari materia doctrine. In particular, a key 
principle underlying a textualist approach to whether two 
statutes are on the same subject ought to be whether the 
audiences of the two statutes are the same.156 Put another way, 
two statutes are on the same subject if the “appropriately 
informed” reader—the audience—is the same. Another way to 
formulate this question is to ask whether those in the audience of 
the statute being interpreted—what I am calling “Statute  
A”—would know about “Statute B,” the statute that might or 
                                                                                                     
748 (2014) (favorably drawing on Justice Scalia’s reference to Caligula 
“publishing the law in a hand so small and posted so high no one could be sure 
what was and wasn’t forbidden. (No doubt, all the better to keep everyone on 
their toes. Sorry . . . .”)). Yet, even he will interpret words in a way that no 
ordinary reader could possibly have been able to do, at least without an 
extensive knowledge of English common law. See Artis v. District of Columbia, 
138 S. Ct. 594, 610 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (interpreting the word “toll” 
in light of common law); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 320–21. 
 154.  This may well be true not just when determining a textualist approach 
to the in pari materia question, but also when applying textualism more 
generally. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative 
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 289 n.43 (1989) (noting that the notion of the 
“objectively reasonable person” simply “begs the question” of what that person 
knows); see also Desai, supra note 146 (explaining the importance of the 
statute’s audience in determining meaning); David Louk, The Audiences of 
Statutes, 105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (same).  
 155.  See William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in 
Statutory Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629, 629 (2001) (“The shared 
understanding of [a text’s] readers constitutes the ‘interpretive community’ for 
the text.”). Despite the use of the term “community,” I do not mean to preclude 
the idea that the audience could in some circumstances be all English-language 
speakers.  
 156.  See id. at 630 (“Judges vary their readings of statutes depending on 
which community comprises their audience for the decision, and rightly so.”).  
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might not be in pari materia with the statute to be interpreted.157 
This certainly does not answer all questions, and a textualist 
could certainly criticize the principle as insufficiently rule-like on 
the rule-standard continuum.158 But, the question is a 
comparative one: is any other approach, at least short of 
abandoning the in pari materia doctrine altogether, both 
compatible with textualist principles and more rule-like? 
Thought of through this lens, it should not be hard to see how 
the Step Zero in pari materia question changes. This approach 
shifts the inquiry from an abstract question of subject-matter 
similarity, a question that might have a philosopher’s, linguist’s, 
or cataloguer’s answer, to the more important question that the 
rule-of-law principle underlying textualism pushes us to consider: 
Whether those subject to the law might be subject to legal rules 
without fair notice. 
C. Statutory Audience and Legal Practice Areas as the 
Subject-Matter Demarcation Lines 
1. Lawyers as Statutory Audience 
The question of audience is often fraught, but I want here to 
introduce a point about statutory audience in a world of legal and 
practical complexity. It is one that many textualists might reject 
as irrelevant to statutory interpretation, but one that might 
nonetheless help shed light on how a textualist could determine 
whether two statutes are in pari materia: An overwhelming 
portion of the United States Code—including even, I suspect, the 
criminal prohibitions found in Title 18—is not read by those who 
are subject to it.159 Indeed, limiting ourselves to those portions of 
                                                                                                     
 157.  See id. at 642–43 (describing the communities and the specific 
knowledge that they possess).  
 158.  See Nelson, supra note 134, at 349 (arguing that what separates 
textualists from others is a greater affinity for rules, rather than a denial that 
intent matters in interpretation).  
 159.  See Drury Stevenson, To Whom Is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 105, 105–06 (2003) (“The people who are subject to the law—the 
citizens — are almost certain never to read it.”); id. (“Average citizens do not 
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the Code that raise litigation disputes, I suspect this may be even 
more true. My point here is not that the bad guys do not read the 
law at all before committing a crime.160 Rather, my point is that 
those who read the law itself—a statute’s actual language—in its 
raw and unexpurgated form, are almost all lawyers and, in 
particular, lawyers advising clients.161 If I am right about this, it 
will help us draw the contours of subject matter in ways that will 
further the textualist’s goal of fair notice. 
Before I turn to the question of audiences more generally, 
though, I want to start with an example that might make this 
point about lawyers—and its connection to the same-subject 
determination—more concrete. Consider two statutes that, in the 
abstract, almost everyone would probably agree are not “on the 
same subject”: the Securities Exchange Act of 1934162 and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.163 Focusing on audience broadly 
speaking though—and again, let me emphasize that the focus on 
audience is to further the important rule-of-law value, embedded 
in a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, that those 
subject to the law must have fair notice of the law’s objective 
meaning — perhaps these two areas of law should be treated as 
                                                                                                     
peruse statute books even once in their lifetimes; most will never read even one 
full paragraph from a court opinion.”). 
 160.  See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) 
(noting that “it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the 
law before he murders or steals”).  
 161.  See Robert K. Rasmussen, Why Linguistics?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1047, 
1051 (1995) (“Few would suggest that many, let alone most, of the statutes 
drafted today are designed to be read by the ordinary person.”); Farber, supra 
note 154, at 289 n.43 (“The vantage point more properly should be that of the 
statute’s actual audience—typically, lawyers applying the conventional 
approach to statutory interpretation . . . .”); see also Stevenson, supra note 159, 
at 145 (“[L]awyers probably constitute most of the actual readership of statutes 
and court opinions; as such, they hold a significant, even primary place in the 
‘audience’ of the law . . . .”). But see generally id. (arguing that the “written 
formulations” of the law are aimed at a set of state actors). 
 162.  15 U.S.C. § 78a (2018).  
 163.  Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). I am purposely at a 10,000-foot 
view here to illustrate the point. The point of course is that no one would expect 
coherence, either linguistic or policy coherence, between these two statutes. One 
might find individual provisions within these two statutes that could indeed be 
viewed as in pari materia, but I would like to stay at this broad level of 
generality for the moment. 
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one. After all, the audience for the Securities Exchange Act is the 
same as, or at least has a very substantial overlap with, the 
audience for the Civil Rights Act: Every publicly traded company 
in the country is subject to both statutes.164 The “audience” for 
the statutes thus has significant overlap, and society expects 
publicly traded companies to know and comply with both 
statutes. But the publicly traded company is of course a legal 
creation and abstraction—certainly an important one to further 
the goals of modern-day capitalism, but a legal abstraction 
nonetheless.165 Rare is the individual human being who would be 
familiar with the details—the statutory language and judicial 
interpretations—of both statutes. Perhaps some super-human 
General Counsels might fall into the category, but viewed from 
the perspective of the actual audience of those who would read 
the statutory language, there is probably little overlap between 
the two statutes.166 Civil rights and employment lawyers, 
perhaps human resources managers as well, will read the Civil 
Rights Act; and securities lawyers will read the Securities Act. 
Others will rely on lawyers’ interpretations of those laws to 
regulate their behavior.167 Clients—let us say the CEO or the 
Board of Directors if we want to humanize the corporate client—
even if one might put them in the category of “ordinary” persons, 
generally do not act without legal advice, and those that do rarely 
do so by having consulted a primary legal text such as a 
statute.168 Importantly, one of the reasons ordinary people do not 
                                                                                                     
 164.  See Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States Corporate 
Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 263 (2010) 
(explaining the Securities Exchange Act’s application to publicly traded 
companies); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) 
(concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 extends to the conduct of private 
actors).  
 165.  Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional 
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 
106 (2009) (“One way of describing the corporation is to say that it is nothing 
more than a legal construct.”).  
 166.  Cf. Blatt, supra note 155, at 642 (explaining that the statute’s audience 
varies “depending upon the substantive area”).  
 167.  See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 146 (“Lawyers are the means by 
which the citizenry gets its best glimpse of the law itself.”). 
 168.  See id. (explaining that the directors and officers of a corporation rely 
on legal counsel to interpret statutes and provide advice). 
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act on the basis of just reading statutory language is a concern 
that there may be other, more relevant laws elsewhere in the 
statute books.169 In other words, even knowing that a statute is 
relevant to a certain factual scenario tends to be a lawyer’s 
task.170 I will return to this broader point shortly. 
In short, to better understand how textualism might properly 
be applied to the question of whether two statutes are in pari 
materia, one must answer the question of whether the audience 
for the two statutes is the same, or whether the audience at least 
overlaps. Put another way, one needs to know who the 
“appropriately informed” objective reader of the statute to be 
interpreted is and what that person knows. 
2. Different Audiences for Different Statutes 
To further explore this idea, we might think of statutory 
language as varying along several dimensions. One dimension 
would be how much the language speaks to the regulated versus 
the regulator. Let us start with a law that is actually read by 
those subject to it, and, for the moment, let us limit ourselves to 
laws read by the “person on the street” or on the so-called 
“Clapham omnibus.”171 For this category of laws, the textualist 
interpreter would presumably treat the “person on the street” as 
the “appropriately informed reader.” Thinking about statutes 
through this lens seems to be implicit in many of the textualists’ 
critiques of intentionalism. I do not want to rehearse here all the 
critiques of substantive canons or even linguistic canons (such as 
expressio unius or the presumption of consistent usage) based on 
ordinary use of language (or how the ordinary person on the 
street might understand the language). Nor do I want to reiterate 
critiques of textualism based on a realistic assessment of the 
                                                                                                     
 169.  Cf. id. at 106 n.4 (“[I]t is [a lawyer’s] job to know or find out the 
relevant law.”). 
 170.  This is of course why first-semester law students are subject to 
issue-spotting exams.  
 171.  See McQuire v. Western Morning News [1903] 2 KB 100, 109 
(explaining that the “man on the Clapham omnibus” is the hypothetically 
reasonable person, who is reasonably educated and intelligent, but not legally 
trained). 
220 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177 (2020) 
legislative process.172 Many of these critiques are based on the 
subjective (author’s) perspective, while the textualist’s focus is on 
the objective (reader’s) perspective.173 Instead, I want to focus 
here on the objective perspective and explore the importance of 
the “person on the street” perspective as it relates to the first step 
of the in pari materia doctrine. In particular, for a law whose 
audience is the “person on the street,” the approach to 
determining if two statutes are in pari materia requires a 
determination of whether that “person on the street” could be 
expected to look at and/or know the second statute (Statute B) 
when interpreting the first (Statute A). If not, the person reading 
Statute A could not be expected to know the text, purpose, 
jurisprudence, or even meaning of Statute B at all, and it would 
be unreasonable for a textualist to rely on that second statute.174 
Relying on Statute B to help interpret Statute A would be, to use 
one of Justice Scalia’s favorite examples, like Caligula writing the 
laws in small characters and hanging them on high pillars, the 
better to ensnare the unsuspecting people.175  
                                                                                                     
 172.  See Gluck & Schultz Bressman, supra note 97, at 911 (“A study of 
drafting [legislative] ‘reality’ has obvious significance for evaluating canons that 
are intended to reflect or affect Congress.”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. 
Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
725, 780 (2014) [hereinafter Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II] (evaluating 
judicial interpretation in light of the realities of the legislative process). 
 173.  See Nelson, supra note 134, at 357–58 (explaining the distinction 
between author-focused interpretation and reader-focused interpretation).  
 174.  Cf. Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 866–67 (1986) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s use of interstatutory interpretation 
because Congress was likely unaware of a “relatively obscure provision” in the 
prior statute when it enacted the second statute). Again, I want to emphasize 
that the point of the cross-referencing in the in pari materia doctrine is distinct 
from using another statute as evidence of general linguistic usage. If the cross-
referenced statute (Statute B) is just used as evidence of general linguistic 
usage, then the person reading the original statute (Statute A) would not have 
to look specifically to or know specifically about Statute B. However, as I noted 
above, such a use of Statute B would not distinguish it as an interpretive aid 
from any other use of Statute B’s language elsewhere in the English language. 
See supra note 108 (elaborating on this distinction). 
 175.  See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Indeed, it is not unlike 
the practice of Caligula, who reportedly ‘wrote his laws in a very small 
character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare 
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On the other end of the spectrum along this dimension would 
be statutory language whose audience is not individuals or the 
regulated entities themselves, but is instead some part of 
government other than the legislature that adopted the statutory 
language—in particular, an administrative agency.176 As 
Professor Ed Rubin has pointed out, many federal statutes are 
what he has called “intransitive,” statutes that  
regulate—empower and/or constrain—the regulators themselves, 
federal agencies, rather than regulating regulated parties 
directly.177 The language in these statutes has a different 
audience, and thus, from the perspective of the textualist, the 
“appropriately informed” objective reader should not be the 
person on the street, but should instead be the federal agency. 
This may be at least one theoretical reason that textualists have 
traditionally been open to Chevron deference.178 If the audience of 
a statute is the agency itself, then it, the agency, is uniquely 
positioned to understand the statutory language and, certainly 
compared with a court, to engage in the interpretive task.179 The 
                                                                                                     
the people.’”). 
 176.  See Edward L. Rubin, The Citizen Lawyer and the Administrative State, 
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1335, 1340 (2009) (identifying a subset of statutes that 
“do not consist of rules governing the populace, but rather they provide 
instructions to administrative agencies”); see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision 
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 625, 625 (1984) (discussing distinction between “conduct rules” that are 
addressed directly to the public and “decision rules” addressed to government 
officials). 
 177.  See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 381 (1989) (explaining the concept of “intransitive” 
statutes, which are directed at administrative agencies rather than citizens).   
 178.  See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations 
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (stating that Chevron “will endure and be given 
its full scope . . . because it accurately reflects the reality of government”). But 
see Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring) (“Chevron’s inference about hidden congressional intentions 
seems belied by the intentions Congress has made textually manifest.”); Brett 
M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2154 
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“[C]ourts 
should [instead] determine whether the agency’s interpretation is the best 
reading of the statutory text.”).  
 179.  See Kavanaugh, supra note 178, at 2152 (stating that Chevron “affords 
agencies discretion over how to exercise authority delegated to them by 
Congress”).  
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agency, in this way of thinking, is the “appropriately informed” 
reader, and so its reading is presumptively correct.180 Key, 
though, is that a textualist should not interpret an intransitive 
statutory provision by viewing it solely through the lens of the 
regulated party and certainly not from the perspective of the 
“person on the street.” 
Rubin’s use of the phrase “intransitive,” with its contrast 
with “transitive,” suggests that these two categories are both 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive, that statutory provisions, like 
verbs, must be one or the other, but may not be both.181 I suspect, 
though, that despite the phrasing, Rubin well recognizes that the 
broader audience of even the most intransitive statutory 
provision has to include not only the relevant agency, but also the 
regulated entities, even if those regulated entities are not its 
primary audience. The Ford Motor Company was no doubt part of 
the relevant statutory audience when Congress empowered the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to 
create auto safety standards,182 and just as much as NHTSA, 
Ford ought to play a part in the interpretive community that a 
textualist concerned with the objective reader should consider.183 
Still, Rubin’s notion of the intransitive statutory provision rightly 
helps frame the question of audience through the reality of the 
                                                                                                     
 180.  See Rubin, supra note 177, at 383 (explaining that an intransitive 
statute affords the agency with a high degree of discretion). I say 
“presumptively” because Chevron does have a first step, and textualists are of 
course more than willing to exercise judicial power to override an agency’s 
interpretation when they view the agency as having done violence to the 
language Congress used. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 
218, 225–32 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (concluding that the Federal Communications 
Commission exceeded its statutory mandate by interpreting term “modify” too 
broadly). 
 181.  See Rubin, supra note 177, at 383 (explaining the distinctions between 
a transitive statute and an intransitive one).  
 182.  Actually, at the time, it was formally the Secretary of Commerce. See 
National Traffic Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 
§§ 102(10), 103(a), 80 Stat. 718-19 (granting power to create safety standards to 
the Secretary of Commerce). 
 183.  See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 129 (explaining that a statutory 
audience “must be the one whose conduct is supposed to be modified by the 
communication”).  
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administrative state.184 With statutes whose audience is an 
administrative agency, it would be an interpretive error to view 
the “appropriately informed reader” as the “person on the 
street.”185 
I want to introduce a second dimension along which laws 
may be placed, one I alluded to earlier: legal intermediaries 
versus individuals/regulated parties. This second dimension may 
be a continuous variable rather than, like Rubin’s, discrete and 
dichotomous, but it too can help determine who the 
“appropriately informed” objective reader is, or perhaps more 
accurately, what is the appropriate linguistic community for the 
statutory language. When determining whether two statutes are 
in pari materia, I contend, this variable will be crucial. 
The language of many statutes is aimed at lawyers, or more 
broadly, agents rather than principals, or intermediaries between 
Congress and the ultimately regulated party.186 These are not all 
the same thing, as I will explain shortly, but, as I mentioned, we 
can think of this idea as simply a continuous variable that all 
statutory provisions have in some measure, some more than 
others. We might take, as a paradigmatic example, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.187 Through a broad purposive lens, 
those rules are designed to adjudicate disputes in a fair and 
efficient manner, and so, they ultimately do affect litigants and, 
secondarily, behavior in the real world.188 But the direct audience 
for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is obviously  
                                                                                                     
 184.  See Rubin, supra note 177, at 373 (“Our dominant implementation 
mechanism [of statutes] at present is the administrative agency.”).  
 185.  See id. at 381–84 (emphasizing the administrative agency’s role in 
interpreting an intransitive statute as opposed to an ordinary person). 
 186.  See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 146 (“Legislators and rulemakers are 
aware that lawyers are their primary readers, and many provisions are included 
to anticipate the reaction of readers schooled in common-law terminology and 
principles.”). 
 187.  FED. R. CIV. P. (adopted in 1937). 
 188.  See Carl C. Wheaton, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Interpreted, 25 
CORNELL L.Q. 28, 29 (1939) (listing the purposes of the rules); cf. Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474–78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (concluding that 
when applying Erie’s substance-procedure distinction, federal courts should 
apply state law “if the choice of rule would substantially affect . . . primary 
decisions respecting human conduct”). 
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lawyers — indeed, more specifically, civil litigators—and the 
textualist who cares about the “appropriately informed” reader 
should expect the interpretive process to be affected by that 
fact.189 To interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through 
an objective reader’s lens requires an understanding of what the 
appropriately informed civil litigator knows, not what the “person 
on the street” knows.190 For example, the fact that no ordinary 
“person on the street” would understand the proper 
interpretation of the word “discovery” as it is used in Title V 
(Rules 26–37) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plays no 
role whatsoever in judicial interpretations of those rules: no 
judge, whether textualist or otherwise, would turn to a lay 
dictionary to interpret the term.191 What matters is how a civil 
litigator would understand the words.192 In contrast, perhaps the 
paradigm of a type of federal statute whose audience would be 
the directly regulated party  — indeed, the person on the street—is 
the laws found in Chapter 51 of Title 18 of the United States 
Code, the federal prohibitions on homicide.193 Some lawyers may 
be murderers, but many murderers are not lawyers. 
My claim, however, is that the broad category of laws at the 
“lawyers as audience” end of the continuum is not limited to 
                                                                                                     
 189.  See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 146 (explaining that statutes are 
drafted with the knowledge that lawyers are the primary readers). 
 190.  See David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV.  927, 970 (2011) (“The 
Federal Rules address matters in the particular technical competence of 
lawyers.”). I recognize of course that some individuals represent themselves pro 
se (and also that simplicity, predictability, notice, etc. might themselves be goals 
of the procedural system), but I do not view that fact as undermining the basic 
point. Cf. Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 384 
(noting that “[p]ro se litigants are more likely to . . . have problems 
understanding and applying the procedural and substantive laws pertaining to 
their claim” (citation omitted)).  
 191.  See Marcus, supra note 190, at 970–71 (explaining the misapplication 
of canons to the rules because canons capture meaning from the ordinary 
person’s perspective). 
 192.  See id. (describing interpretation of the rules from the perspective of 
lawyers). 
 193.  See Rubin, supra note 177, at 376 n.21 (distinguishing modern 
legislation, which regulates government agencies, from “traditional rules” like 
crime, which directly regulate private conduct (citing F.A. HAYEK, LAW, 
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 124 – 44 (1973))).  
INTERSTATUTORY INTERPRETATION 225 
provisions like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules whose 
impact on primary behavior is indirect at best. Rather, my 
contention is that the overwhelming majority of federal laws (or, 
perhaps the more important denominator here is not federal 
laws, but rather laws that raise interpretive disputes) are actually 
read by lawyers, not their clients—and here, by “laws,” I again 
mean statutory language—and that this fact should matter, 
again at least to the extent that one cares, as textualists should, 
about who the appropriately informed objective reader is and 
what that person knows.  
Now there is obviously a balance to be struck here. Justice 
Scalia’s focus on the rule-of-law principle of notice to the 
governed194 is a vital part of the textualist’s interpretive 
process.195 And the importance of law being understandable to 
the ordinary person rather than lawyers dates back at least to 
Bentham’s contention that lawyers and judges were an elite 
caste, a guild, controlling access to vital information at the 
expense of the common folk.196 It is also said to be one of the great 
advantages of the civil law system over the common law system, 
and of course, Justice Scalia has decried the continuing influence 
of common-law thinking in approaches to statutory 
interpretation.197 But at the same time, textualists well 
                                                                                                     
 194.  See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Indeed, it is not unlike 
the practice of Caligula, who reportedly ‘wrote his laws in a very small 
character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare 
the people.”). 
 195.  See Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982, 984–85 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (reading “not less than 7 days” literally despite clear evidence 
that Congress meant “not more than 7 days” because courts should “not pull the 
rug out from under a litigant who relied on the enacted text”). 
 196.  See H.L.A. HART, The Demystification of the Law, in ESSAYS ON 
BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 21, 29–39 (1982) 
(explaining Bentham’s analysis of complex statutes that created the heightened 
role of lawyers and judges); Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of 
Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 739 
n.89 (1992) (stating that “Bentham and many others [worried] that excess 
reliance on technical meanings has the antimajoritarian effect of excessively 
empowering an elite of lawyers and judges”); see generally Desai, supra note 146 
(noting this phenomena). 
 197.  The title of Justice Scalia’s famous Tanner Lectures was “Common-Law 
Courts in a Civil-Law System.” See SCALIA, supra note 121; see also Easterbrook, 
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understand that there are times and places for a more technical 
meaning.198 The question, then, is when lawyers rather than the 
“person on the street” should be viewed as the statutory 
language’s audience. Now, it is true that I am effectively making 
an empirical claim without evidentiary support, but the claim is 
actually weaker than it might at first appear. In some sense, it is 
just a variation of a claim Professor Stephen Ross made over two 
decades ago, that statutes usually either apply to citizens “via 
administrative regulations . . . or concern special areas of law 
that no ordinary citizen would attempt to comply with without 
legal advice.”199  
Now, I may be loading the dice in my favor with my example 
here, but consider federal tax law.200 Millions of individuals and 
entities are subject to the detailed provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) (and Treasury or Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) regulations).201 And yet, while many determine compliance 
                                                                                                     
supra note 148, at 82 (noting that pragmatic arguments are “fine in a 
common-law world but not in the domain of statutes and regulations”). 
Codification too has as one of its goals the simplification of law. See Stevenson, 
supra note 159, at 106 n.5 (explaining Bentham’s rationale for creating a 
“comprehensive utilitarian code”).   
 198.  See, e.g., Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 608–17 (2018) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (relying on, among other things, the common law to 
interpret statutory text); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 269, 276 (2017) (arguing that though the Constitution’s audience 
was the public, “some of the content may have been contained in technical 
language (for example, ‘ex post facto Law’) accessible via the division of 
linguistic labor between experts (lawyers) and other members of the public”); 
Solum, supra note 117, at 500 (noting that “some constitutional language seems 
to be technical in nature”).  
 199.  Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1057, 1059 (1995); see also id. at 1067 (“[M]ost federal statutes are written 
for a narrower linguistic sub-community of specialists and lawyers.”); 
Stevenson, supra note 159, at 150 (“If the idea is that the words of a statute 
should be given the meaning that a non-lawyer would understand, this is odd; 
the people do not read the statutes, do not plan around the words. The words 
were addressed to state actors, and the question should be what the meaning is 
for them.”). 
 200.  See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 146 (identifying “environmental, 
antitrust, [and] tax regulations” as areas of the law that are particularly suited 
for lawyer interpretation). Apparently, for those in the know, I could also pick 
the law of baseball. See id. at 112 (noting that the official Rules of Baseball “are 
as tedious and difficult to decipher as the tax code”). 
 201.  See Andrea Monroe, Hidden in Plain Sight: IRS Publications and a 
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without a lawyer, virtually none does so by directly  
consulting—by reading the language in—the Internal Revenue 
Code, Title 26 of the U.S. Code202 (let alone the Statutes at 
Large—more on that distinction shortly). Tax lawyers, 
accountants, IRS and Treasury officials, all might be viewed as 
part of the relevant linguistic sub-community for the statutory 
language actually found in the IRC, but the ordinary “person on 
the street” is obviously not in the group.203 Virtually every 
“person on the street”—indeed, almost everyone and every entity 
regulated by the IRC—complies by following a computer program 
or, at best, by reading an IRS publication.204 In fact, even many in 
the group I have described as the relevant linguistic sub-
community for the statute get their understanding of the 
statutory language not from the statute or code but from IRS 
publications written by agency employees.205 While not all of 
these people are lawyers, many are.206 In any event, the precise 
contours of the actual linguistic sub-community are not as 
important to me as the underlying point, that the audience 
(however defined) of some statutes207 is lawyers.208  
                                                                                                     
New Path to Tax Reform, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 81, 84 (2017) (describing the wide 
breadth of those who “make up the federal income tax community”). 
 202.  26 U.S.C. §§ 1–9834 (2018).  
 203.  See Monroe, supra note 201, at 83 (“Very few taxpayers turn directly to 
the Internal Revenue Code to determine their federal income tax liability.”); 
Blatt, supra note 155, at 642 (“Taxation, for example, is the province of a 
relatively small cadre of lawyers . . . .”). 
 204.  See Monroe, supra note 201, at 83 (explaining that “taxpayers rely on 
intermediaries,” such as commercial software or the IRS to file their taxes). 
Moreover, this is how the Internal Revenue Code’s drafters view things too. See 
Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Z. Osofsky, Constituencies and Control in Statutory 
Drafting: Interviews with Government Tax Counsels, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1291, 
1336 (2019) (“[Code drafters] are writing with other subject matter experts and 
intermediaries (including agency officials) in mind.”).  
 205.  See Monroe, supra note 201, at 84 (explaining that IRS publications 
play an important role in interpreting tax law for intermediaries).   
 206.  See id. at 115–16 (stating that most of the tax expert community are 
lawyers).  
 207.  And again, let me emphasize that, when I say “statutes,” I mean the 
statute’s language, not the statute itself. So while the “audience” for tax statutes 
is of course those who are subject to the tax, the audience for the statutory 
language is the specialist community of tax lawyers and IRS officials. See Oei & 
Osofsky, supra note 204, at 1336 (“[E]xpert intermediaries, not ordinary 
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This insight—though perhaps not the empirical claim—is 
already embedded in statutory interpretation theory, practice, 
and pedagogy. So, while I think Professor Ross should get some 
credit for a clear and explicit exposition of the idea, it is implicit 
in the notion of technical versus “ordinary” meaning, a distinction 
taught in most current statutory interpretation texts.209  
The question of “ordinary” versus technical meaning 
intertwines directly with the notion of statutory audience.210 The 
classic case used to illustrate the importance of audience in 
statutory interpretation is the 1893 case, Nix v. Hedden,211 the 
famous “Is a tomato a fruit or a vegetable?” case.212 In Nix, the 
Supreme Court had to interpret a federal statute that imposed a 
tariff on fruits that was different from the tariff imposed on 
vegetables. The Court determined that a tomato was, for 
purposes of that statute, a vegetable; and this was despite the 
fact that, botanically, a tomato is the “fruit of a vine.”213 
Famously relying in part on the fact that no one has tomatoes for 
dessert,214 the Court concluded that the statute incorporated a 
                                                                                                     
taxpayers, [are] the audience for tax statutes . . . .”).  
 208.  See Blatt, supra note 155, at 643 (“The legal profession itself is one 
policy subcommunity.”); see also Rasmussen, supra note 161, at 1052–53 
(discussing bankruptcy as an example of this same phenomenon). 
 209.  See, e.g., WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL 
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 200–09 (5th ed. 2009); WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
645 – 47 (5th ed. 2014) (detailing the differences between ordinary meaning and 
the technical meaning of words); OTTO J. HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 396 – 98 (4th ed. 2008) (using Nix v. Hedden, 149 
U.S. 304 (1893) to introduce the distinction between ordinary and technical 
meaning); LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 87–92 (2d ed. 2009) (describing how to determine technical 
meaning); SAMUEL ESTREICHER & DAVID L. NOLL, LEGISLATION AND THE 
REGULATORY STATE 195–205 (2d ed. 2017) (section on “technical vs. lay 
meaning”).  
 210. See Oei & Osofsky, supra note 204, at 1336 (explaining the relationship 
between drafting choices and an expert audience). 
 211.  149 U.S. 304 (1893).  
 212.  See id. at 306 (“The single question in this case is whether tomatoes, 
considered as provisions, are to be classed as ‘vegetables’ or as ‘fruit,’ within the 
meaning of the Tariff Act of 1883.”). 
 213.  Id. at 307. 
 214.  Id. Obviously, the Justices had never encountered pastry chef Maggie 
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lay definition of “fruit,” rather than a technical one.215 It is 
difficult to imagine a textualist objecting to this result, despite 
the strength of the dictionary definitions undercutting it.216 
Indeed, the modern-day textualist would probably celebrate the 
approach, relying as it does on “the common language of the 
people.”217 But the more sophisticated textualist should go 
further, recognizing that the Court relied on the fact that most 
importers would view tomatoes as vegetables, not fruits.218 The 
key is not simply that the Court chose a lay definition, but that a 
textualist might legitimately view the importer (non-botanist) 
businessperson as the “appropriately informed” interpreter.219 
And it is the “appropriately informed” interpreter who should be 
viewed as the objective reader of the relevant statutory provision, 
here the tariff.  
In short, the statute’s audience was traders in tomatoes, not 
horticulturalists, and so the Court interpreted the term “fruit” 
not to encompass tomatoes, despite the fact that the dictionary 
contradicted its conclusion.220 The flip side of this is of course 
cases involving specialized meaning: for example, the 
interpretation of contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
where specialized usage “in the trade” prevails over ordinary 
                                                                                                     
Huff’s artistic creations, such as “Fresh and Candied Tomatoes with Peaches, 
Plums, and Bitter Almond Sorbet,” at Dallas’s famous FT33 restaurant. See 
Chelsea Morse, 5 Ways to Eat Tomatoes for Dessert, FOOD & WINE (Aug. 3, 2015) 
https://perma.cc/EHV7-S2MV (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (sharing five of pastry 
chef Maggie Huff’s ideas for tomatoes as dessert) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Tara Parker Pope, Vegetables Crash the Dessert 
Menu, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2018, at D4 (providing examples of ways chefs 
around the country have used “vegetables,” including tomatoes, as desserts). 
 215.   Nix, 149 U.S. at 307.  
 216.  See, e.g., Tomato, CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1517 (12th ed. 
2011) (defining “tomato” as “a glossy red or yellow edible fruit, eaten as a 
vegetable or in salads”). 
 217.  Nix, 149 U.S. at 307. 
 218.  See id. at 306–07 (relying (in part) on the testimony of two importers to 
find that in the common language of the people, tomatoes are vegetables).  
 219.  See id. (finding that under a botanical definition, tomatoes are fruits, 
“[b]ut in the common language of the people, whether sellers or consumers of 
provisions,” tomatoes are vegetables). 
 220.  Nix, 149 U.S. at 307.  
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meaning.221 The “plain” meaning of words may not always be the 
meaning apparent to the ordinary reader.222 To determine the 
“plain” meaning, if there is one, requires a determination first of 
the relevant linguistic sub-community to whom that meaning 
would be “plain.” Were the term “fruit” used in, say, the Plant 
Variety Patent Act,223 the textualist interpreter would 
undoubtedly ask not whether sellers or importers of tomatoes 
would view tomatoes as vegetables, but instead whether 
scientists who might apply for a plant patent would. The relevant 
audience for that statute would be different, and the word “fruit” 
would thus probably have a different definition; it would not 
matter that tomatoes are, as the Court in Nix v. Hedden put it, 
not fruits “in the common language of the people.”224 Moreover, 
textualists well recognize the importance of technical meaning 
where the intended audience is the “specialized sub-community of 
lawyers.”225 All this is perhaps a long way to say that laws can be 
placed on a continuum as to how much the relevant linguistic 
sub-community encompasses lawyers, rather than the “person on 
the street” and/or regulated parties generally, with the laws of 
legal procedure on one side of the continuum and criminal laws 
covering, say, violent acts on the other. 
3. Textualism, Statutory Audience, and the Same-Subject 
Determination 
What does all this have to do with the in pari materia 
doctrine? My claim is, actually, quite a lot. At its core, Step Zero 
                                                                                                     
 221.  See U.C.C. § 1-303 cmts 1, 3 (AM. LAW INST. UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); 
see also Ross, supra note 199, at 1067 (noting that “outside arbitrators resolving 
disputes under the Uniform Commercial Code” place greater emphasis on trade 
usage “rather than on the ‘plain meaning’ of the black textual letters written on 
the pieces of paper bound together as the United States Code”).  
 222.  Cf. SOLAN, supra note 88, at 54–55. 
 223.  7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2018). 
 224.  Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893). 
 225.  See John Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 
419, 434–35 (2005) (“[W]here appropriate in context, textualists seek out 
technical meaning, including the specialized connotations and practices common 
to the specialized sub-community of lawyers.”).  
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of the in pari materia doctrine asks whether two statutes are “on 
the same subject,” and textualism asks, in the first instance, who 
the “appropriately informed” reader is. Thus, for a textualist to 
determine whether a statute (or a statutory provision) is “on the 
same subject” as another statute (or statutory provision) requires 
determining whether the appropriately informed reader would 
know about the other statutory provision and would view it as 
being “on the same subject.” Or, perhaps more accurately, 
whether the law should expect the appropriately informed reader 
to know about the other statutory provision, a “constructive 
knowledge” standard, so to speak.  
Shortly, I will give some examples to help illustrate how to 
make this determination, but you do not have to agree with any 
of them to see how this framing changes the core of interstatutory 
interpretation. Rather than asking an abstract question about 
how similar the subject matters of the two statutory provisions 
are, the focus shifts to the core of the first inquiry that a 
textualist must make every time s/he interprets a statute, who is 
the appropriately informed reader. To be sure, most textualists 
usually answer the question implicitly and often with the “person 
on the street” as the answer.226 But, even if that is the answer 
and even if one goes so far as to reject the importance of the 
lawyer in my Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and tax law 
examples,227 and claim that the “appropriately informed reader” 
is always the “person on the street,” the central point remains: for 
a textualist to determine whether a second statute is in pari 
materia with a first requires determining whether the 
appropriately informed reader would know about the second 
statute. Here, I am not defining the term “know about,” since as I 
said, it would most likely be a “constructive knowledge” standard 
and would almost certainly be an objective, rather than 
subjective, inquiry. Rather, I am simply delineating in broad 
terms the nature of the inquiry, rather than its precise 
contours.228 The key is that a textualist should not really look to 
                                                                                                     
 226.  See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text.  
 227.  See supra notes 186–208 and accompanying text.  
 228.  If the appropriately informed reader is the person on the street, 
however, the inquiry would likely yield a far narrower category of appropriate 
uses of the in pari materia doctrine than if the appropriately informed reader 
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another statutory provision elsewhere in the law unless the 
appropriately informed reader would do the same. Otherwise, the 
same-subject determination could undermine one of textualism’s 
most important goals, the rule-of-law value of fair notice to the 
regulated party.  
Since often that reader is a lawyer, not a “person on the 
street” and/or regulated party, determining whether one 
statutory provision is in pari materia with another requires 
understanding something about whether the “appropriately 
informed” lawyer would know about the second statutory 
provision.229 That is one reason, I suspect, that most textualists 
are ardent proponents of the Whole Act Rule: context matters 
because the appropriately informed reader is expected to read the 
entire statute and think of the entire statute as a coherent 
whole.230 A typical “person on the street” would probably not 
know to do that, but a lawyer would — or, at least, the law expects 
a lawyer to do so. The question this way of framing the 
same-subject determination raises then is what other statutes (or 
statutory provisions) is the appropriately informed reader 
expected to have read and to think of as relevant in the 
interpretive process. 
D. Applying Textualism to the Same-Subject Determination 
Let us turn to a well-known example of the Supreme Court 
relying on one statute—actually, several statues—to interpret a 
second, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey.231 While 
                                                                                                     
were a lawyer, a point I will return to below. 
 229.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 230.  But see Gluck, supra note 26, at 203 (“Absent clear evidence to the 
contrary, consistency presumptions should not be applied for exceedingly 
lengthy statutes, for different statutory sections within a single statute drafted 
by multiple committees, or across different statutes.”). 
 231.  499 U.S. 83 (1991). Casey is found in most statutory interpretation 
casebooks. See, e.g., CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 486–524; 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 859–66 (5th ed. 
2014); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 857–69 (5th ed. 2009); LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID 
CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 151–60 (2d ed. 2009). 
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the Court never used the phrase “in pari materia,” it was clearly 
channeling the concept.232 Casey involved the interpretation of 
the term “attorney’s fee” in a 1976 statute that provided for the 
shifting of fees in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.233 The 
question was whether the relevant statutory provision, codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1988,234 permitted fee-shifting for testimonial and 
nontestimonial experts.235 One key rationale that Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, relied on was that “[t]he record of 
statutory usage demonstrates convincingly that attorney’s fees 
and expert fees are regarded as separate elements of litigation 
cost.”236 Looking far and wide throughout the United States Code, 
the Court noted that Congress had in some circumstances 
explicitly listed “expert witnesses” or “expert witness fees” in 
fee-shifting statutes, whereas at other times, it had not.237 The 
Court strengthened this argument with the fact that Congress 
had adopted many fee-shifting statutes with language that 
explicitly shifted “expert” fees in 1976 itself, the very same year 
Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the statute that was being 
interpreted.238 Indeed, Congress had passed a fee-shifting 
provision with the words “expert witnesses,” in the Toxic 
Substances Control Act,239 “just over a week prior to the 
enactment of § 1988.”240 By negative implication, the Court 
concluded that § 1988’s use of the term “attorney’s fee” without 
the additional reference to “expert fees” meant that “expert fees” 
were excluded and that § 1988 thus did not permit the shifting of 
expert fees.241 
                                                                                                     
 232.  See NELSON, supra note 231, at 506 (“The principle on which the 
majority relies in [Casey] is closely related to the in pari materia idea.”). 
 233.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); Casey, 499 U.S. at 84. 
 234.  Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–559, 90 
Stat. 2641, amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 
1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 
 235.  Casey, 499 U.S. at 84.  
 236.  Id. at 88. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2).  
 240.  Casey, 499 U.S. at 88. 
 241.  Id. at 92. 
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Importantly, the array of fee-shifting provisions Justice 
Scalia cited was wide-ranging: “[a]t least 34 statutes in 10 
different titles of the United States Code explicitly shift 
attorney’s fees and expert witness fees,”242 including statutes on 
environmental law,243 consumer protection law,244 maritime 
employment law,245 health law,246 and civil rights.247 As the Court 
put it, “[t]hese statutes encompass diverse categories of 
legislation, including tax, administrative procedure, 
environmental protection, consumer protection, admiralty and 
navigation, utilities regulation, and, significantly, civil rights.”248 
In dissent, Justice Stevens focused on the specific intent of 
Congress when passing § 1988.249 He concluded that the goal of 
the fee-shifting provision was to make prevailing plaintiffs whole 
and that a decision denying recovery for expert fees would create 
incentives for attorneys to take on many of the tasks that could 
more efficiently be performed by experts.250 He concluded that 
“[t]he fact that Congress has consistently provided for the 
inclusion of expert witness fees in fee-shifting statutes when it 
considered the matter is a weak reed on which to rest the 
                                                                                                     
 242.  Id. at 89. 
 243.  Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (2018); 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2018); Natural 
Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60121(b) (2018); Endangered Species Act of 
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2018); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2632 (a)(1) (2018). 
 244.  Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(h)(1) (West 1993) 
(repealed 1994); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c), 2072(a), 
2073(a) (2018).  
 245.  Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments 
of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 928(d) (2018). 
 246.  National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-31(c) 
(2018). 
 247.  Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2018). 
 248.  West Virginia U. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 89 (1991). 
 249.  Id. at 104–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 250.  Id.; see also Friedrich v. Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Posner, J.) (“To forbid the shifting of the expert’s fee would encourage 
underspecialization and inefficient trial preparation.”).  
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conclusion that the omission of such a provision represents a 
deliberate decision to forbid such awards.”251 
Numerous commentators have criticized the majority’s 
opinion as “incoherent”252 or “unrealistic”253 or worse.254 I suspect 
though that nearly all of that criticism, like Justice Stevens’s in 
dissent, comes from those who were unsympathetic to the result 
and sympathetic instead to the policy of making the plaintiff 
“whole” that Justice Stevens in dissent saw as embedded in the 
statute.255 Moreover, one can also critique the opinion as being 
insufficiently realistic about the way Congress really  
works256 — even though Congress adopted several other 
fee-shifting provisions around the same time,257 it seems 
                                                                                                     
 251.  Casey, 499 U.S. at 115–16. 
 252.  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of 
Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hosps. 
Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 
689 (1992) (arguing that the result of Casey is a “[c]ourt-imposed incoherence, 
blind both to the manifest congressional purpose and to the real-world 
consequences of the literalistic reading”).  
 253.  See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 189–93 (critiquing the “exclusively 
text-based comparisons of isolated statutory provisions” in the majority’s 
opinion in Casey and other cases as reflecting an “impoverished and politically 
unrealistic view of legislation and the legislative process”); cf. Bressman & 
Gluck, supra note 172, at 781 (finding that of the forty-one statutes the Casey 
Court cited, only four came from the Judiciary Committee, while the rest of the 
statutes came from other Committees).  
 254.  See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 179 (arguing that the majority’s opinion 
reflected an “impoverished” view of legislation and the legislative process). 
 255.  See Casey, 499 U.S. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“This Court’s 
determination today that petitioner must assume the cost of $104,133 in expert 
witness fees is at war with the congressional purpose of making the prevailing 
party whole.”).   
 256.  See id. at 108–11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority’s 
inattention to the legislative history of the statute and Congress’s desire to 
require courts to shift fees in civil rights cases); Buzbee, supra note 1, at 179 
(arguing that text-based comparisons of statutes ignore the reality that 
“Congress enacts laws in different periods, to be implemented by different 
agencies and administrations, against a different backdrop of case law, statues, 
and agency regulation”); Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 252, at 693–98 
(critiquing the majority’s ignorance of Congress’s “long-standing policy that 
successful civil rights plaintiffs be able to recover the costs of vindicating their 
rights” and its attempt to respond to Supreme Court cases intruding on that 
policy); see also infra Part IV. 
 257.  See supra notes 242–248 and accompanying text. 
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plausible, perhaps likely, that no one in Congress at the time 
realistically considered the negative implication, because the 
relevant drafters may not have even been aware of those other 
fee-shifting provisions with their explicit reference to “experts.” 
But as Professor (now, Dean) John Manning has pointed out, 
these sorts of arguments, based in either purposivism or 
subjective intentionalism, are precisely what a good textualist 
seeks to eschew.258 My point here is not to take sides in this 
debate, but simply to point out that none of the criticism takes 
textualism seriously as the driver of the decision. The so-called 
Meaningful Variation Canon259 is a staple of the textualist 
toolbox, and none of the critiques takes on the question of 
whether the decision might (or might not) represent an 
objective-reader approach to statutory interpretation. 
So, I want to look at the case through the lens of textualism 
itself, focusing on the notion of objectified intent and the 
appropriately informed reader. We can in fact critique aspects of 
Justice Scalia’s reasoning—although, as we will see, not 
necessarily the result—as not being sufficiently textualist. By 
that, I mean that Justice Scalia may well have been too much of a 
subjective intentionalist, failing to focus on objectified intent.260 
Now, I should back up to note that one almost trivially easy 
textualist argument would have been based on plain meaning, to 
say simply that an expert is not an attorney and so the term 
“attorney’s fee” does not include an expert’s fee. The problem was 
that that argument was precluded by a case two years earlier, 
                                                                                                     
 258.  See Manning, supra note 225, at 443–45 (in the context of discussing 
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Casey, noting that textualists reject “the impulse to 
make the semantic details of a statute more coherent with its apparent 
animating policy—the impulse that underlines classic intentionalism . . . .”). 
 259.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW 109 (2016). 
 260.  See Manning, supra note 225, at 424 (arguing that textualists focus on 
objectified intent, “the import that a reasonable person conversant with 
applicable social and linguistic conventions would attach to the enacted words”). 
I want to emphasize again that my discussion focuses entirely on what I’m 
calling “Step Zero” of the in pari materia doctrine, whether two statutes are in 
fact “on the same subject,” i.e., whether two statutes should be treated as one for 
purposes of interpretation. I am not concerned with what I’m calling the 
application of the in pari materia doctrine, what the interpreter should do after 
determining that the two statutes are in pari materia. 
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Missouri v. Jenkins,261 which had held that the same term, 
“attorney’s fee,” in the very same statutory provision, 42 
U.S.C. § 1988, applied to more than just “attorney[s]” in a literal 
sense: it also covered the fees of paralegals, law students, and law 
clerks who had not yet passed the bar, none of whom were 
“attorney[s]” in the literal sense either.262 The dictionary alone 
could thus not decide the case. And so, Justice Scalia’s best 
argument was rooted in the “statutory usage,” the Meaningful 
Variation Canon argument that comes from the inclusion of the 
specific term “experts” in those numerous other fee-shifting 
statutes.263  
In essence, the question of whether it is appropriate to look 
to the other fee-shifting statutes (the “statutory usage,” as Justice 
Scalia called it)264 devolves to a question of whether § 1988 is in 
pari materia with those other fee-shifting provisions. For if so, it 
would be appropriate to treat them all as, in effect, one statute. 
But if not, there would be no reason to think that “statutory 
usage” should be consistent, any more than would the use of the 
term “attorney’s fee” in, say, German law or Nebraska law or 
even some other, non-legal sources.  
How to treat “statutory usage” in Casey depends almost 
entirely on a characterization of the contours of the subject 
matter. Implicitly, the majority is focused on the attorneys’ fee 
provision itself. If the law of fee-shifting is the “subject matter,” 
then it makes perfect sense for the many fee-shifting provisions 
littered throughout the United States Code to be in pari materia 
with 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The logic goes something like this: (1) all 
fee-shifting provisions are on the same subject; (2) all statutory 
provisions on the same subject must be read as if they are part of 
one statute; (3) Section 1988 must thus be read in a way that 
renders it linguistically coherent with all other fee-shifting 
                                                                                                     
 261.  491 U.S. 274 (1989). 
 262.  Id. at 285. See also Manning, supra note 225, at 442 (“Under modern 
textualism, of course, one could not say that the matter begins and ends with 
the conclusion that an ‘expert fee’ is literally not an ‘attorney’s fee.’”). 
 263.  See West Virginia U. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 92 (1991) (“We 
think this statutory usage shows beyond question that attorney’s fees and 
expert fees are distinct items of expense.”).  
 264.  Id. 
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provisions, including many that contain explicit references to 
experts; and (4) therefore, applying the Meaningful Variation 
Canon,265 the absence of an explicit reference to experts in 
Section 1988 means that experts are not included in Section 1988 
(or, presumably, any time the term “attorneys’ fees” is used by 
itself). 
The problem with that argument, though, is that one can just 
as easily characterize the “subject matter” of Section 1988 as 
anti-discrimination law (or, perhaps more broadly, civil rights 
law or even poverty law), not the law of fee-shifting. And, 
importantly, nothing in an abstract notion of “subject matter” tells 
us which of these two categorizations is correct. Indeed, one 
cannot even view either of the two categories (fee-shifting v. 
anti-discrimination law) as inherently narrower than the other. 
The category of fee-shifting covers numerous statutory provisions 
not in the category of anti-discrimination law, and vice versa. 
These two categories of subject matter are like overlapping circles 
in a Venn diagram, with Section 1988 in the intersecting space.266 
How then to choose? 
The answer for a textualist, I contend, ought to be found in 
the notion of the appropriately informed objective reader. And 
this is where I return to my earlier claim that the audience for 
many statutes is lawyers.267 While a fee-shifting provision might 
not be as far over on the lawyer side of my lawyer-client 
continuum as the rules of civil procedure,268 it is probably pretty 
close. The fee-shifting provision and its interpretation is likely to 
affect the civil litigator’s strategy (“Am I going to hire an 
expert?”),269 and while the interpretation may well ultimately 
                                                                                                     
 265.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 259, at 109.  
 266.  Compare, e.g., Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 149–50 
(1989) (finding the venue provision of National Bank Act of 1863 to be narrower 
than the venue provision of Securities Exchange Act of 1934), with id. at 159 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting that both statutes are narrow along one 
dimension: The National Bank Act only applies to banks but covers all causes of 
action, whereas Securities Exchange Act only applies to securities cases but 
covers all parties).  
 267.  See supra Part III.C.1.  
 268.  See supra text accompanying notes 187–192.  
 269.  See Casey, 499 U.S. at 106–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing how 
experts generally “save lawyers’ time and enhance the quality of their work 
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have an impact on the underlying substance of 
anti-discrimination law and thus on clients, that effect is 
secondary. The primary audience for the law is lawyers. But, we 
must slice our categories even more finely than that, since if I’m 
right that most statutes are read by lawyers, not clients, then 
denominating a category of “lawyers” as audience would mean 
that the in pari materia doctrine would resemble the nineteenth 
century notion that all law is part of a single whole and must 
thus all cohere.270 So, since audience—the appropriately informed 
reader — is what matters, the key is to subdivide the category of 
lawyers rather than abstractly subdivide the category of law.  
Here, then, my claim is that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Casey 
failed to focus sufficiently on objectified intent or the 
appropriately informed reader, but instead bled over to subjective 
intent. There is, however, a way to focus the inquiry on objective 
meaning, and, as I noted, it requires first determining the 
provision’s audience and then determining what the law should 
expect that audience to know.271 
So, let us look a little closer both at the category of lawyers 
who might read Section 1988 and the category of lawyers that 
might read the other fee-shifting provisions Justice Scalia relied 
on.272 First, the category of lawyers reading Section 1988 is likely 
limited to civil litigators.273 The question then is whether the 
category is more limited than that. My sense is that it is, that the 
category can be thought of as civil rights litigators. Notice now 
that I am making an empirical claim here, one based on the 
                                                                                                     
product” and that in this case they were “necessary” and “essential” for the 
prosecution’s case); Friedrich v. Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989) (“To 
forbid the shifting of the expert’s fee would encourage underspecialization and 
inefficient trial preparation, just as to forbid shifting the cost of paralegals 
would encourage lawyers to do paralegals’ work.”).  
 270.  See supra Part II.B. 
 271.  See supra Part III.C.3. 
 272.  See supra notes 242–248 and accompanying text.  
 273.  Cf. Annotation, Construction and Application of Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988), Providing that Court 
May Allow Prevailing Party, Other than United States, Reasonable Attorney’s 
Fee in Certain Civil Rights Actions, 43 A.L.R. Fed. 243, § 3(b) (1979) (“[T]he 
purpose of the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act . . . is to encourage 
private enforcement of federal civil rights.”). 
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sociology of legal practice. The category is, I contend, as a factual 
matter, limited to the kind of lawyers who bring or defend claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims that might result in fee-shifting 
under Section 1988; very few others would read § 1988.  
If I am right about that, then some of Justice Scalia’s 
statutory fee-shifting references work and others do not. The 
relevant dividing line should be between laws that civil rights 
attorneys would know about and those laws they would not know 
about. So, Justice Scalia’s references to the fee-shifting provisions 
in numerous environmental statutes (Toxic Substances Control 
Act,274 Resources Conservation and Recovery Act,275 Endangered 
Species Act276) and others on energy (Natural Gas Pipeline Safety 
Act Amendment of 1976,277 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
of 1978278), consumer protection (Consumer Product Safety 
Act279), tax (Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982280), 
and transportation (Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973,281 
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976282) 
would not be relevant, because civil rights litigators simply would 
not be familiar with those statutes at all. On the other hand, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964283 and Equal Access to Justice Act 
(EAJA)284 should fit comfortably within the knowledge base of the 
audience of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (i.e., lawyers litigating cases under 
§ 1983). That is why Justice Scalia rightly emphasized the EAJA 
when he noted that the statutes whose fee-shifting provisions 
explicitly mention “expert[s]” “encompass diverse categories of 
                                                                                                     
 274.  15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (2018).  
 275.  42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2018). 
 276.  16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2018). 
 277.  49 U.S.C. § 60121(b) (2018). 
 278.  16 U.S.C. § 2632 (a)(1). 
 279.  15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c), 2072(a), 2073(a). 
 280.  26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B) (2018).  
 281.  45 U.S.C. § 726(f)(9) (2018).  
 282.  Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94 – 210, 90 Stat. 31, repealed by Technical Amendments to Transportation 
Laws, Pub. L. No. 103–429, 108 Stat. 4377 (codified as amended 45 U.S.C. 
§ 854(g)). 
 283.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). 
 284.  28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (2018). 
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legislation, including tax, administrative procedure, 
environmental protection, consumer protection, admiralty and 
navigation, utilities regulation, and, significantly, civil rights” 
before mentioning the EAJA.285  
Moreover, the fact that some of these laws were adopted 
right around the same time as Section 1988—in particular, the 
Toxic Substances Control Act, which Justice Scalia made a 
special point of noting was enacted a little more than a week 
before Section 1988—ought to be viewed as irrelevant from the 
perspective of the “appropriately informed” objective reader. After 
all, why would the “appropriately informed” reader of the Civil 
Rights Act be expected to know the Toxic Substances Control Act 
or when it was adopted? In the abstract, one could imagine an 
argument: readers of statutes should know when a statute was 
passed and should know other statutes adopted on or around the 
same time. The nineteenth century version of the in pari materia 
doctrine in fact had a variation of this idea with a rule that two 
statutes passed on the same day were to be viewed as in pari 
materia.286 But, this doctrine faded away in time,287 and probably 
with good right. These days, it is the rare individual who actually 
reads statutes. We all read codes now. Only where something in 
the codified version of a statute raises a red flag would one turn 
to the Statutes at Large, and even then, most of the time, one 
would not. True, Section 1988’s fee-shifting provision might be 
one such circumstance. But looking at the original Civil Rights 
Act Amendments of 1976 in the Statutes at Large288 is certainly 
                                                                                                     
 285.  West Virginia U. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 89 (1991) 
(emphasis added). 
 286.   JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND 
THEIR INTERPRETATION § 86, at 75, n. 4 (1882). This was a somewhat powerful 
doctrine particularly in an era when Congress passed a large number of statutes 
on March 3, the last day of the Congressional term. Cf. The Significance of 
March 4, UNITED STATES SENATE, https://perma.cc/GNS5-X92B (last visited Oct. 
17, 2019) (noting that until 1933, March 4 was the first day of a Congressional 
term) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 287.  Compare, e.g., BISHOP, supra note 286, § 86, with SUTHERLAND, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.03, at 237–40 (7th ed. 2017) 
(noting that statutes passed on the same day should be construed together only 
if they relate to the same subject). 
 288.  The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641, 2641 (1976). 
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not the same as browsing the 1976 Statutes at Large until one 
comes across the same or similar (or dissimilar) terms that might 
help interpretation. The negative implication argument from, 
say, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 might have some 
purchase from the perspective of subjective intentionalism, at 
least if one is unwilling to delve into the specifics of legislative 
history.289 After all, both statutes were passed by the same 
Congress almost simultaneously.290 Surely if we could 
anthropomorphize Congress into a single person, that fact would 
be relevant. But by itself, the fact that two statutes were passed a 
little more than a week apart is of very little relevance from the 
perspective of objectified intent or an appropriately informed 
reader. No reader of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 would know what other 
statutes were passed a week before. No one reads the Statutes at 
Large in order, and in any event, the fee-shifting provision in the 
Toxic Substances Control Act, though adopted only eight days 
earlier, was 600 pages before § 1988 in the Statutes at Large.291 
The question then is what might be relevant to an 
appropriately informed reader when trying to determine the 
meaning of words in a statute such as the fee-shifting provision 
in § 1988. Broadly speaking of course, background principles, 
relevant common law, the rules of English grammar and syntax, 
certain canons of construction, any number of possible categories. 
But how should a textualist determine whether the in pari 
materia doctrine applies, whether a second statute is in fact in 
pari materia with the statute to be interpreted, whether the 
fee-shifting provision in the Toxic Substances Control Act is 
relevant to § 1988? The answer, I contend, has to lie in the notion 
of the appropriately informed reader: A second statute is in pari 
materia with the statute to be interpreted if and only if the 
                                                                                                     
 289.  Cf. Nelson, supra note 134, at 416 (arguing that textualism should best 
be understood as a preference for rules over standards rather than as a rejection 
of subjective intent). 
 290.  See Casey, 499 U.S. at 88 (“In 1976, just over a week prior to the 
enactment of § 1988, Congress passed those provisions of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act.”). 
 291.  Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 19(d), 90 Stat. 
2003, 2041 (1976); The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641, 2641 (1976).  
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appropriately informed reader would know that second statute. I 
want to emphasize again one thing about this approach: it is 
dependent on a sociological construction of audience,292 and it is 
not necessarily going to yield the same answer over time. That 
might be enough to tank the idea in the minds of some 
textualists, but it is my contention that textualists are doing this 
implicitly all the time anyway—when determining whether two 
statutes are in pari materia—and so this approach simply makes 
explicit what needs to be explicit to apply textualism to the 
determination of whether two statutes are in pari materia.  
Now, I suspect that this portion of the opinion, relying on, as 
Justice Scalia puts it, “statutory usage,” was not the driver of the 
decision.293 Rather, the fact that the word “expert” is not in the 
phrase “attorneys’ fees” and that the term “attorney” does not 
ordinarily include an expert was a far more important factor in 
the real rationale for the majority.294 But I raise this issue 
because it helps illuminate the key point underlying the 
same-subject determination. If textualism is to have a principled 
way to determine when one statute is on the same subject as 
another, then it requires identifying the relevant audience. It 
may be that some applications of textualism do not require this 
sort of identification of audience, but the same-subject 
determination does. And, even if you think my category for 
Section 1988, civil rights litigators, is either too narrow or too 
broad (or wrong on some other dimension), one still needs to 
answer the question of who Section 1988’s relevant audience is. 
It is obviously not enough to say that the objective reader is 
the “person on the street” or that one must look to the “plain 
meaning,” since the question here is whether or not the 
interpreter should look to another statutory provision found 
                                                                                                     
 292.  See supra notes 272–291 and accompanying text. 
 293.  Casey, 499 U.S. at 88–92. 
 294.  See id. at 99–100 (finding that expert services have never been included 
in an attorneys’ hourly rates). But see Manning, supra note 225, at 442 (“Under 
modern textualism, of course, one could not say that the matter begins and ends 
with the conclusion that an ‘expert fee’ is literally not an ‘attorney’s fee.’”). The 
6–3 majority included three Justices who had dissented from Missouri v. 
Jenkins, the case that held that the term included paralegals, law clerks, etc. 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 274 (1989). 
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elsewhere in the United States Code. The question is completely 
orthogonal to one about “plain meaning,” and so “plain meaning” 
plays no role.295 
E. Textualism’s Audience Problem 
My claim raises several issues, both about textualism and 
about statutory interpretation in general. The first and most 
obvious is my claim that a textualist’s need to focus on audience 
necessarily requires thinking about lawyers and thus 
lawyering.296 As I noted, I suspect many textualists would resist 
this idea, in large part because of the way in which textualism’s 
notice rationale has been intertwined with the Benthamite notion 
that the law must be understood by the “person on the street.”297 
It may be that we should broaden our conception of the relevant 
linguistic sub-community beyond a group of lawyers to include 
regulated parties as well. But, as I hope was clear from my 
example of the Civil Rights Act and the Securities Exchange 
Act,298 doing this might broaden the concept of “same subject 
matter” to the point that any statute anywhere is fair game for 
interstatutory cross-referencing, rendering the concept so 
capacious as to be unhelpful in constraining judges at all—in 
effect, a Whole Code Rule. It may well also be that, when 
thinking about a statute’s “shared context,” as Professor Solum 
has put it, one must incorporate not just the post-adoption 
statutory audience but also those participants in the legislative 
process who, although not drafters in literal terms, are in fact 
participants in the complex communicative process that results in 
legislation.299 
                                                                                                     
 295.  Just to reiterate: one can of course look to the ordinary meaning of the 
term “attorneys’ fees” and conclude that the term excludes experts. The question 
here though is whether or not the “statutory usage,” as Justice Scalia put it, id. 
at 88, elsewhere in the United States Code can be viewed as relevant for 
understanding the term. On that question, the concept of “plain meaning” plays 
no role. 
 296.  See supra Part III.C. 
 297.  See supra notes 196–199 and accompanying text. 
 298.  See supra Part III.C.1. 
 299.  Conversation between Professor Larry Solum and author. 
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Second, as may be clear by now, the fundamental question 
Step Zero of the in pari materia doctrine asks of the textualist is, 
how much trans-statutory context is a judge permitted to draw 
on. Thought of narrowly, the question is one about statutory 
interpretation. Thought of broadly, though, it can also be thought 
of as a question of institutional choice. Federal judges are 
generalists, while outside of the elite appellate and Supreme 
Court bars, most lawyers are specialists.300 Indeed, most of the 
principles of statutory interpretation, like the principles 
embedded in trans-substantive areas of the law such as, say, 
administrative law or even some of the traditional common law 
subjects such as “property law,” are almost consciously and 
perhaps explicitly designed to transcend a single subject 
matter.301 In some ways, then, my proposal may appear to 
undermine (or at least sit in tension with) the basic idea that 
there ought to be trans-substantive principles of statutory 
interpretation.302 After all, the proposal draws boundaries based 
on lawyering practice groups that are not trans-substantive in 
the way Article III courts or the Supreme Court practice at an 
elite D.C. firm would be.303 This is all true.  
My only real defense is that some lines must be drawn and 
that this is precisely what Step Zero of the in pari materia 
doctrine should be doing, determining when a trans-substantive 
principle of law applies and when it doesn’t. Without some kind of 
limitation on the in pari materia doctrine, it amounts to a carte 
                                                                                                     
 300.  See Neal Katyal & Morgan Goodspeed, The Future of Appellate 
Advocacy? More Generalists, Fewer Appeals, 54 DUQ. L. REV. 367, 367–69 (2016) 
(noting that appellate lawyers are the rare generalists, as lawyers continue to 
specialize, and that “[f]ederal judges are generalists”). 
 301.  Cf. Evan J. Criddle, The Constitution of Agency Statutory 
Interpretation, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 325, 342 (2016) (“Trans-substantive 
norms also inform statutory construction. Interpretive norms are 
‘trans-substantive’ if they are attentive to systemic concerns that transcend the 
specific statutory regime under review.”). 
 302.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Dynamic Theorization of Statutory 
Interpretation, 2 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 2, 29 (2002) (“The new textualism 
presents itself as a trans-substantive theory: whatever the subject area, the 
statutory plain meaning must trump all other considerations (except when the 
result is just so unreasonable as to be absurd).”). 
 303.  See Katyal & Goodspeed, supra note 300, at 368 (describing appellate 
practices as more generalist). 
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blanche for courts to pick and choose helpful interpretive aids 
from wherever they find them. In other words, Step Zero of the in 
pari materia doctrine demands that the interpreter draw some 
lines. Doing so not only creates boundaries around a statute by 
delineating its “subject matter,” but also effectively draws a line 
between the general and the specific, a line determining in effect 
how much courts as generalists may draw upon the whole corpus 
of law to decide a case about a single statute. Thus, any 
determination of when interstatutory cross-referencing is 
appropriate will have the effect of cutting off some portions of the 
statutory corpus. By asking a textualist court to think of the 
problem through statutory audience and thus, as I have argued, 
through the lens of legal practice areas,304 this fact does not 
change. Moreover, since the proposal is based on a “constructive 
knowledge” standard, the proposal does not directly dictate 
precisely where the boundary between the general and the 
specific should be.305 If, taking Casey as an example, we expect 
the lawyer who litigates Section 1983 cases to know about the 
Toxic Substances Control Act’s attorneys’ fee provision, then the 
latter would be deemed to be in pari materia with Section 
1988.306 In fact, if we think of the problem through the lens of a 
lawyer at the Solicitor General’s Office, DOJ Civil Appellate, or 
an elite appellate practice at a firm like Jones Day or O’Melveny 
& Myers, then expecting the lawyer to treat these two fee-shifting 
provisions as in pari materia doesn’t seem all that unreasonable. 
Surely an appellate specialist would research and look to the use 
of a similar term elsewhere in the law to help shed light on the 
term’s meaning.307 As I said, such an approach might expand the 
in pari materia doctrine to such a point that it starts resembling 
the nineteenth century notion that all statutes should cohere, 
which is not too different from not really having any limitations 
on statutory cross-referencing at all.308 The key point, though, is 
                                                                                                     
 304.  See supra Part III.C. 
 305.  See supra Part III.C.3. 
 306.  West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88 (1991). 
 307.  See Katyal & Goodspeed, supra note 300, at 368 (describing appellate 
practice as more generalist). 
 308.  See supra notes 286–287 and accompanying text.  
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that the relevant inquiry is the choice of statutory audience, 
combined with a determination of how much the law is going to 
expect those in that statutory audience to know.309 My own 
inkling is that a category like “civil rights litigator” is more 
appropriate than “appellate lawyer” for Section 1988’s audience, 
but that choice certainly shapes the result.310  
Moreover, the way in which one draws the lines could result 
in a self-reinforcing feedback loop.311 If the law tells lawyers to 
look elsewhere in the U.S. Code to understand the meaning of a 
law being interpreted, they will be more likely to do so. If the law 
says not to bother, they will not.  
Relatedly, the determination of how much to expect of the 
audience, however defined, can thus have an impact on the costs 
of litigating a statutory-interpretation dispute. This point 
parallels the arguments about costs in the legislative-history 
debate, both decision costs in the narrow sense, but also to the 
extent that the question of costs includes litigation costs. The 
more broadly a court is willing to allow trans-statutory 
cross-references, the more lawyers will need to devote resources 
to finding such cross-references. This is precisely the fear that 
textualists have voiced about the use of legislative history, known 
as “Justice Jackson’s lament.” 312 This dovetails back to a point I 
made earlier: the textualist who cares about decision costs should 
want a narrower in pari materia doctrine because a narrower in 
pari materia doctrine reduces decision costs and thus litigation 
costs.313 In my 42 U.S.C. § 1988 example, that would counsel for 
                                                                                                     
 309.  See supra Part III.C. 
 310.  See supra Part III.D. 
 311.  I am indebted to Professor Craig Green for this point. 
 312.  See Richard A. Danner, Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives on the Availability of Legislative History, 13 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 151, 152 (2003) (“[Justice Jackson] voiced his concern that the 
materials of legislative history were not readily available to all lawyers arguing 
cases before the Court.”); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory 
Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower 
Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 70 (2018) (discussing the 
impracticability of Justice Jackson’s “committee reports only” compromise “in an 
era of unorthodox lawmaking characterized by omnibus legislation, emergency 
legislation, and massive last-minute amendments”). 
 313.  See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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“civil rights litigators” rather than “appellate lawyers” as the 
proper audience. It would thus support my claim that Justice 
Scalia was correct to cite the attorneys’ fee provisions in the 
EAJA and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but that he was wrong to 
cite the attorneys’ fee provisions in the array of other statutes on 
which he relied.314 
In sum, for a textualist to make a same-subject 
determination requires grappling with the question of statutory 
audience, because textualists care about interpretation from the 
objective-reader’s perspective. In many cases, I suspect it also 
means grappling with the world of lawyers, not just the world of 
law, and in many cases, it requires delineating subject matter 
based on the lines of legal practice.315 As I noted before, I 
recognize that it is somewhat counter-intuitive to treat law’s 
audience as being lawyers rather than the regulated parties.316 
But, the basic idea is that even if the law’s audience is a 
regulated party, the audience for the statutory language is 
lawyers.317  
Just as importantly, even if you don’t accept the details of my 
argument, the fact that the same-subject determination requires 
far more than the known tools of textualism helps us understand 
one important facet of textualism, the importance of defining a 
statute’s “appropriately informed” reader in the relevant 
linguistic sub-community.  
IV. Interstatutory Cross-Referencing and the Intentionalist 
Modality in Statutory Interpretation 
A. Intentionalism and Purposivism 
Subjective intentionalists who care about Congressional 
intent would likely view the question of whether two statutes are 
in pari materia differently from textualists whose focus is on 
                                                                                                     
314. See supra notes 274–285 and accompanying text. 
 315.  See supra Part III.C. 
 316.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 317.  See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text. 
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objectified intent and the appropriately informed reader.318 If an 
interpreter cares about actual Congressional intent, one place to 
go of course is the legislative history. But I want to sidestep the 
legislative-history debate and assume that the legislative history 
says nothing useful about the relationship between the two 
statutes. In such circumstances, what should the committed 
intentionalist do to determine whether two statutes are in pari 
materia? 
The answer most courts give, at least implicitly, is to have 
intentionalism bleed over to purposivism but to do so with a dash 
of imaginative reconstruction.319 I want to emphasize here the 
differences between subjective intentionalism and purposivism as 
modalities of statutory interpretation. By subjective 
intentionalism, I mean what has traditionally been referred to as 
just plain “intentionalism,” a notion whose origins date back at 
least to Blackstone, who wrote that “[t]he fairest and most 
rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by 
exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made.”320 
Intentionalism thus instructs the interpreter to focus on 
gleaning the actual subjective intent of the legislature at the time 
it adopted the statute. This approach has been subject to attack 
on many grounds, particularly the view that a collective body can 
have no intent.321 But I want to ignore that critique here, since 
                                                                                                     
 318.  See supra Part III.C. 
 319.  See supra Part II (outlining what courts do to determine if statutes are 
in pari materia). 
 320.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59 (1803). Textualists have of 
course appropriated Blackstone as their own, and with some good right. See, 
e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: 
Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L. 
REV. 121, 142 (2018) (arguing that “the Constitution’s structure supports 
textualism” based in part on James Wilson’s citation of “Blackstone’s textualist 
method of construing statutes”). But it is still probably fair to say that subjective 
intentionalism has played a role throughout the history of Anglo-American 
interpretation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early 
Understandings of the ‘Judicial Power’ in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1002 (2002) (discussing Blackstone and the role of 
subjective intent of legislators in eighteenth century statutory interpretation).  
 321.  See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 
(1930) (“A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with 
words which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number 
rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have 
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my goal is simply to give those who are intentionalists tools for 
thinking about the same-subject determination when there is no 
evidence about specific legislative intent. After all,  
many—indeed, most—judges care about legislative intent in some 
measure, based on the presumption that the legislature is the 
primary policy-making body in our society and that the judge’s 
job is to be the legislature’s “faithful agent.”322 For such 
interpreters, subjective intent matters.323 
Intentionalism contrasts with purposivism.324 Though there 
is some overlap in the group of proponents of these two 
interpretive modalities, the two are distinct,325 and I want to be 
clear that my proposal in this Part is aimed at intentionalists, not 
                                                                                                     
had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.”); Kenneth A. 
Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 
INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals have intentions and 
purposes and motives; collections of individuals do not.”). But see Elizabeth 
Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND POLITICS 360, 363 (Keith E. Whittington & Daniel Kelemen eds., 2008) 
(citing MACKIE, DEMOCRACY DEFENDED (2003)) (“Although Arrow’s Theorem 
suggests that collective decision-making may lead to irrational outcomes and 
other social choice work points to the possibility of instability in collective 
bodies, neither demonstrates that all collective choice will be meaningless.”); 
CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILLIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND 
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 4 (2011) (“Some talk of group agents may be 
metaphorical, to be sure, and some may misconceive reality. But often the 
ascription of agency to groups expresses a correct and important observation, 
both in common and in scientific discourse.”); MISREADING LAW, supra note 88, at 
135–36 (“[M]achines do not have minds, nor does Congress—the only important 
question is “how” they decide. So, too, the question here is not whether Congress 
has a mind but how it decides and what it means by its decisions.”); Lawrence 
Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in 
Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 449 (2005) (“Therefore, when judges 
speak of legislative intent and attribute reasons to the legislature as though it 
were a single individual with a mind of its own, they are simply doing what we 
all do when we talk about deliberative groups.”). 
 322.  See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 
90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 112 (2010) (“The view that federal courts function as the 
faithful agents of Congress is a conventional one.”). 
 323.  See id. (“[T]he classical approach to statutory interpretation[] claims 
that a judge should be faithful to Congress’s presumed intent rather than to the 
statutory text when the two appear to diverge.”). 
 324.  See Garrett, supra note 321, at 361–66 (intentionalism), 369–72 
(purposivism). 
 325.  See id. (describing purposivism and intentionalism).  
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purposivists. In fact, as I alluded to earlier and will explain in 
more detail below, the current approach—ad hoc as it is—may 
well be a better way of thinking about the relationship between 
two statutes through a purposivist lens than would my proposal 
in this Part of this Article.  
Purposivism has its roots in the so-called “mischief rule,” 
dating back at least to Heydon’s Case in 1584.326 Its most 
prominent modern expositors though are Hart and Sacks.327 The 
“mischief rule” is the notion that the interpreter must first 
identify the “mischief,” the problem in the state of the real world, 
that the legislature intended to correct when passing the statute 
and then “to make such construction as shall suppress the 
mischief, and advance the remedy.”328 Drawing on this way of 
thinking, Hart and Sacks famously added an explicit reference to 
the “reasonableness” of the legislators.329 Purposivists in the Hart 
and Sacks/Legal Process tradition are thus to assume in the 
course of determining a statute’s purpose that, “unless the 
contrary unmistakably appears, . . . the legislature was made up 
of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably.”330 Of course, intentionalists also care about 
statutory purpose at some level, but an intentionalist would 
identify purpose by focusing on evidence about the views of the 
actual enactors.331 This would be distinct from the hypothetically 
                                                                                                     
 326.  See Heydon’s Case [1584] 76 Eng. Rep. 637; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a.; see also 
Elliot Coal Min. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 17 F.3d 616, 
631 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[A]dditional support for our parsing of the text of the 
Act . . . can be found in the ‘mischief’ rule, discussed in the venerable Heydon’s 
Case. . . . That canon of construction directs a court to look to the ‘mischief and 
defect’ that the statute was intended to cure.”). 
 327.  See William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal 
Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2042–43 (1994) (summarizing the contributions 
of Hart and Sacks to purposive statutory interpretation scholarship).  
 328.  Heydon’s Case at 638. 
 329.  See HENRY MELVIN HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1954) (“Why would reasonable men, 
confronted with the law as it was, have enacted this new law to replace it?”). 
 330.  Id. at 1378. 
 331. See Garrett, supra note 321, at 369 (discussing broad goals of 
intentionalism). 
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“reasonable legislator” that a purposivist in the Legal Process 
tradition would use.332 
If we focus then on the subjective intentions of the actual 
legislators, one might ask why other statutes should be relevant 
to the interpreter at all. This of course would naturally lead to 
the question of whether the specific lawmakers believed that the 
putatively in pari materia statute was “on the same subject” as 
the statute to be interpreted. One could also frame the question 
slightly differently and ask instead whether the legislators 
believed that the two statutes should be treated as one. The 
answer to these two questions might well be different. It is easy 
to imagine legislators viewing two statutes as being on the same 
subject in the abstract, but not wanting courts to treat them as 
one from the perspective of either textual/linguistic consistency or 
policy coherence. As we will see though, my proposal elides this 
distinction, in part because I am addressing circumstances when 
there is no evidence of legislative intent.  
But there is the preliminary question of why, if at all, other 
statutes should be treated as relevant if one cares about 
subjective intent. As I noted, the most viable answer would of 
course be that the actual legislators thought the second statute 
was in fact relevant to the first. So, naturally, if there were 
evidence of specific intent, such as evidence from legislative 
history, a subjective intentionalist would presumably view that 
evidence as highly relevant to, if not dispositive on, the question 
of whether the second statute should be used when interpreting 
the first.  
There might, however, be other considerations that a 
subjective intentionalist would take into account, particularly if 
there were no evidence of specific intent. And these other 
considerations seem to be at least one factor that courts are 
attempting to intuit when they seek to answer the question of 
whether two statutes are on the same subject. So, for example, 
courts that look to the placement of a provision within the United 
States Code,333 simultaneity of adoption,334 or just a broad 
                                                                                                     
 332.  See id. (“[A]ll three foundational theories incorporate some purposive 
analysis. What distinguishes the theories is how the purpose is identified.”). 
 333.  See, e.g., United States v. Cowboy, 694 F.2d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir. 1982) 
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intuitive sense that two laws are on the same subject,335 are often 
attempting to glean a subjective Congressional intent on the 
question of whether the statutes are in pari materia. But usually 
courts infer the relationship without any explicit evidence of 
specific intent, and so we can view these clues of subjective intent 
more as a probabilistic assessment of likely intent. Again, though, 
the key point is that this is a form of subjective intentionalism 
because its focus is on the statutory drafter, not (as textualists 
would) the statutory reader/audience.336 Of course, this approach 
can be criticized for assessing the probabilities wrongly. Perhaps 
proximity in the United States Code or simultaneity of passage or 
even intuitive subject-matter similarity do not really indicate 
anything about the legislators’ actual views about whether the 
two statutes should be read as one. Perhaps it is always a 
statute-by-statute specific inquiry. But the courts grappling with 
a rationale for relying on indirect evidence of this sort are likely 
engaged in a process of searching for evidence of probable intent. 
B. Interstatutory Cross-Referencing and the Legislative Process 
If making a probabilistic assessment of legislative intent 
might appeal to a subjective intentionalist when there is no 
explicit evidence of actual legislative intent, how might a 
                                                                                                     
(analyzing four neighboring statutory provisions in such a way as to have them 
“read together to reach a consistent result”). 
 334.  See, e.g., United States v. King, 322 F.2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1973) (“When 
[the precursor of Section 191] was reenacted . . . , the forerunner of Section 192 
was passed as a companion measure. This coincidence of enactment raises an 
inference that the two provisions should be read together as parts of a single 
legislative plan.”).  
 335.  See, e.g., Stevens v. C.I.R., 452 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 1971) (“Federal 
policy toward particular Indian tribes is often manifested through a combination 
of general laws, special acts, treaties, and executive orders. All must be 
construed in pari materia in ascertaining congressional intent.”). 
 336.  See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 
419, 419–20 (2005)  
[F]ederal judges long assumed that when a statute was vague or 
ambiguous, interpreters should seek clarification, if possible, in the 
bill’s internal legislative history. . . . [T]extualism . . . is associated 
with the basic proposition that judges seek and abide by the public 
meaning of the enacted text. 
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subjective intentionalist do this? In particular, since the in pari 
materia question (through the intentionalist lens) asks whether 
the legislature viewed the two statutes as on the same subject, 
what ought an interpreter consider? 
1. Congressional Committees as Proxy for Subject-Matter 
My answer is that the interpreter should look to the 
lawmaking process. This approach draws on the ideas of much 
recent scholarship urging statutory interpretation to become 
more sensitive to the legislative process.337 To determine whether 
two statutes are on the same subject, one might then reframe the 
question around the organization of subject matter in the 
legislature itself.  
One frame for this might be the United States Code, which is 
of course the place where Congress inserts almost all of its 
statutory language.338 The problem with the United States Code 
from the intentionalist perspective though is that it is the rare 
                                                                                                     
 337.  See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 178, at 4 (“Our constitutional system 
charges Congress, the people’s branch of representatives, with enacting laws. 
So, how Congress makes its purposes known, through text and reliable 
accompanying materials constituting legislative history, should be respected lest 
the integrity of legislation be undermined.”); Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding 
Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the 
Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1123 (2011) (“It is time to take a serious 
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justification yet to fully emerge.”); cf. McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of 
Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 
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statutory interpretation as a means of determining legislative intent); Daniel B. 
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative 
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2003) (“Legislation is the product of choices made 
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 338.  See Researching Federal Statutes, THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
https://perma.cc/NB35-NRAA (last updated June 9, 2015) (last visited Oct. 3, 
2019) (providing access to all of those statutes) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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legislator who actually thinks about the world through the 
organizational lens of the United States Code.339 Indeed, even 
among congressional staffers, a code-focused way of thinking 
about law seems limited primarily to the nonpartisan Legislative 
Counsel offices in each house of Congress.340 
Instead, the primary lines of demarcation for subject matter 
in Congress itself are based on the committee structure.341 
Statutes generally come from a committee,342 and with some 
exceptions (more on this below), much of the language was 
drafted either in a committee (i.e., by a staffer or lobbyist who 
provides it to the committee) or by a Legislative Counsel staffer 
                                                                                                     
 339.  See Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 735 
(discussing legislative methods of drafting, including “structural features like 
the centrality of committee jurisdiction, the type of statutory vehicle, the path 
the statute takes through Congress, and the requirement that statutes be 
“scores” for budgetary purposes—each of which affects how statutes are drafted 
and understood inside Congress”). 
 340.  See generally id. at 739–47 (discussing the “central” role of Legislative 
Counsel in drafting legislation). 
 341.  See Gluck, supra note 26, at 202 (citing Schultz Bressman & Gluck 
Part II, supra note 172, at 747–49) (“The organization of Congress into 
committees emerges from the Gluck-Bressman study as the most salient 
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inside Congress.”); see also Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The 
Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 87 
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membership on the committee that deals with it.”); SCOTT ADLER, WHY 
CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS FAIL: REELECTION AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 
3 (2002) (“In many ways congressional committees are the essential machinery 
that propels the legislative process.”); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN 
COMMITTEE xiii (1973) (“[M]embers specialize in their committee’s subject 
matter, and hence . . . each committee is the repository of legislative expertise 
within its jurisdiction.”); cf. also DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 1 (1997) (“Jurisdictions are 
property rights over issues. They distinguish one committee from another; they 
attract legislators to certain panels, and they set boundaries on what politicians 
can and cannot do.”); KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE 
ORGANIZATION 1 (1991) (explaining that structural features of the legislature 
affect legislative outcomes).  
 342.  See Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 648 (2012) 
(“Congressional committees have been central to lawmaking since the early 
nineteenth century.”). 
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whose primary responsibilities and expertise are tied to a 
committee.343 
The implication of this fact for interstatutory 
cross-referencing is probably now clear: Congressional 
committees—perhaps even subcommittees—can serve as a proxy 
for interpreters trying to determine whether two statutes are on 
“the same subject.” The demarcating lines between one committee 
and another are precisely the way Congress thinks about and 
defines the subject matter of law when it produces, and then 
adopts, statutory language. I should reiterate that using 
congressional committees in this way is obviously just a proxy for 
making a probabilistic determination of congressional intent, and 
so I am assuming a lack of specific intent on the question. The 
key point is that thinking about similarity of “subject matter” 
through the lens of the legislative process gives a subjective 
intentionalist a connection between the same-subject 
determination and the legislature’s own categories of subject 
matter.  
This idea, rooted as it is in the lawmaking process, is of 
course built on the backs of empirical work in both political 
science and law, particularly the seminal Gluck/Bressman 
study344 and the work of people like Judge Katzmann345 and 
Professors Nourse and Schacter.346 Indeed, in the specific context 
of the consistent-usage and meaningful-variation canons, 
Professor Gluck has made this very point, that the “whole act” 
and “whole code” rules should be abandoned.347 I want to 
                                                                                                     
 343.  See Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 741 (finding 
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emphasize though that because of that, it is rooted in subjective 
intentionalism as a modality in statutory interpretation. 
2. Legislative Process for Textualists? 
A textualist, whose theory of statutory interpretation is 
rooted in the objective reader, might still reject this approach to 
the same-subject determination for that basic reason. This would 
particularly be the case for the textualist who views the “person 
on the street” as the relevant objective reader. As I noted in Part 
III, this assumption seems to underlie much of the textualist 
approach.348 How, the textualist might ask, is the objective reader 
expected to know whether two statutes were drafted by the same 
committee? The drafting committee is generally nowhere to be 
found in the text. Indeed, the very premise of this whole portion 
of the Article is that we have no evidence of specific intent about 
the same-subject determination, whether in the text or even in 
the legislative history. Through the textualist lens, this is of 
course all true. 
But even for the textualist, there may be a sliver of merit to 
opening up the sausage factory just this one little bit, especially 
when compared with the prospect of identifying the 
“appropriately informed” reader that I explained in Part III is 
necessary to an objective-reader approach to the same-subject 
determination.349 Or, perhaps worse yet, when compared with the 
prospect of a highly curtailed version of the in pari materia 
                                                                                                     
committees and the lack of communication between them.”); see also Schultz 
Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 781 (noting that the Casey Court 
ignored the fact that most of the cross-referenced fees provisions had been 
drafted by other Committees). 
 348.  See supra Part III (discussing the textualist approach); see also, e.g., 
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 
2144 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) 
(arguing that judges should first determine the “best reading” of a statute by 
reading the statute “as ordinary users of the English language might read and 
understand” it). 
 349.  See supra Part III (discussing the importance of identifying the 
“appropriately informed” reader in an in pari materia analysis).  
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doctrine that a “person on the street”-as-audience approach would 
necessitate.350 
First, to the extent that what ultimately animates textualism 
is a preference for rules over standards,351 creating demarcation 
lines rooted in the jurisdictional lines of congressional committees 
is relatively rule-like. It’s not perfect of course. Many statutes are 
drafted by multiple committees, the committees in the two 
Houses do not align in terms of their jurisdiction, and perhaps 
most importantly, committee jurisdiction can change over time: 
names will change, committees will be created, committees will 
disappear, etc.352 So, my suggestion is by no means a true rule on 
the rule-standard continuum.353 
At the same time, its rule-like nature does create a 
significant reduction in decision costs, thereby promoting another 
important value that textualists hold dear.354 Indeed, the 
committee demarcation approach to the same-subject 
determination might have lower decision costs than the approach 
rooted in the objective reader that I outlined in Part III.355 
Second, an approach rooted in the demarcation lines of 
congressional committees could fit with an objective 
reader-focused view of statutory interpretation if one accepts the 
premise that an “appropriately informed” reader would be aware 
of congressional committees. This of course is highly 
controversial, and as an empirical matter, may well be false. But 
                                                                                                     
 350.  See supra note 228. 
 351.  See Nelson, supra note 134, at 348 (“Indeed, textualists themselves 
have acknowledged that the contrast between rules and more flexible 
‘standards’ is important to their approach.”). 
 352.  See David C. King, The Nature of Congressional Committee 
Jurisdictions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 48, 48 (1994) (“Jurisdictions are not rigid 
institutional facts that rarely change. Rather, they are turbulent battle grounds 
on which policy entrepreneurs seek to expand their influence.”). 
 353.  Plus, as I explain below, “unorthodox lawmaking” and different types of 
laws make this proposal an incomplete tool at best. See infra Part IV.B.3 
(discussing “unorthodox lawmaking” in more detail).  
 354.  See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 355.  See supra Part III (discussing the “objective reader” approach to the in 
pari materia analysis). Naturally, an approach that assumed a “person on the 
street” as the objective reader would have significantly lower decision costs, but 
at what I suspect almost all judges would view as the unacceptable cost of 
allowing virtually no interstatutory cross-referencing. 
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thinking about this proposal through the lens of the 
“appropriately informed” reader again brings into focus the 
question of who exactly that person is and what the law should 
expect that person to know.356 Again, if the textualist’s focus is on 
the objective reader, the same-subject determination necessarily 
requires an answer to the question of who that objective reader is 
and thus what that person knows.357 My sneaking suspicion is 
that most textualists would recoil at the thought that the law 
should expect any objective reader to know which congressional 
committee(s) a particular law came through. The whole inquiry 
would likely be anathema to most textualists. But understanding 
why can help shed light on the question of how elastic textualism 
might be, not only as to the same-subject determination, but also 
in general. 
For if I am right that the same-subject determination forces 
out into the open the question of statutory audience in the theory 
underlying the textualist modality of statutory interpretation, 
then it also forces open the question of why it would be 
inappropriate to think the statutory audience should know the 
committee origins of a given statute. I want to reiterate that I 
believe most textualists would view the inquiry as illegitimate. 
The reasons why are not hard to enumerate: (1) Committees 
and/or committee jurisdiction demarcation lines are not in the 
text of the law and so nothing about the committees passed 
through the Article I, Section 7 process to become law; 
(2) requiring courts (or expecting an objective reader) to know 
which committee(s) a law went through would increase decision 
costs; and (3) as an empirical matter, those who read statutes do 
                                                                                                     
 356.  See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 337, at 1147  
Sophisticated textualists . . . sometimes bow to the relevant 
‘interpretive community’ but define that community not as the people, 
but as expert lawyers. Shifting the inquiry to a ‘relevant community’ 
has the important virtue of noticing that there is an audience for 
statutes, but it raises its own ambiguities: how are we to determine 
the relevant audience?  
 357.  Cf. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 2118, 2144 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 
(2014)) (positing “ordinary users of the English language” as the relevant 
reader). 
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not know which committee (or even, with the exception of 
revenue bills, which house of Congress!) a statute came from.  
Though there may not be satisfactory answers to these 
objections (in which case I refer the textualist to Part III), I 
reiterate that the question is comparative. Recall that the 
same-subject determination is the way in which a court 
determines the appropriateness of interstatutory 
cross-referencing, and we are positing that neither the text nor 
the legislative history contain explicit clues to help make the 
determination. One answer then is of course for the textualist to 
conclude that therefore the two statutes are not in pari materia, 
that (in essence) the context of Statute A, the statute being 
interpreted, does not include the other statute, Statute B. That’s 
reasonable enough, but of course, as I noted in Part III, that 
would mean that Justice Scalia was wrong in Casey on textualist 
grounds. So, I don’t think any textualist is willing to cut him or 
herself off from relying on other statutes when there is no explicit 
textual evidence that the two statutes are in pari materia. 
But I think there are at least partial answers to the 
objections laid out above. To the first objection—that committees 
are not in the text that became law—the answer lies in an 
oft-made critique of textualism, one that intentionalists level at 
textualism all the time when defending the use of legislative 
history: the linguistic (and substantive) canons that textualists 
are more than willing to rely on358 didn’t pass through the Article 
I, Section 7 process either. Since most textualists recognize that 
communication depends on the relevant interpretive 
community,359 the question is not what did or did not pass 
through the Article I, Section 7 process, what is or is not law. 
Instead, the question is what tools or evidence a court is 
permitted to use in interpreting the law (the words that did pass 
                                                                                                     
 358.  See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13 (listing fifty-seven 
“canons,” none of which went through the Article I, Section 7 process to become 
law); GORSUCH, supra note 148, at 132. 
 359.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 
533–34 n.2 (1983) (“Wittgenstein showed that no system of language can be 
self-contained and that meaning thus must depend in part on logical structure 
and understandings supplied by a community of readers.”). 
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through the Article I, Section 7 process),360 and the same-subject 
determination asks whether one can look to a different statute. 
All my suggested criterion—look to the statutory origins, which 
we know are generally found in committees—does is to help make 
that determination. It simply assists the reader in the task of 
knowing whether or not the broader context of Statute A, the 
statute to be interpreted, includes Statute B, the putatively in 
pari materia statute. 
To the second potential objection—that requiring 
interpreters to know the committee(s) from which a law came will 
increase decision costs—the question is again comparative: 
increased decision costs compared with what? Professor Manning 
has praised Justice Scalia’s decision in Casey as a paragon of 
textualism because of Justice Scalia’s reliance on “statutory 
usage” rather than legislative history.361 But the decision is based 
on a romp through the United States Code.362 The decision costs 
could have been reduced significantly if the Court had limited 
itself to statutes that had passed through the same committees as 
42 U.S.C. § 1988. Knowing the committee from which a law came 
is, literally, a single piece of information that, as a practical 
matter, is now easily available for virtually all laws on 
Congress.gov, Lexis, and Westlaw.363  
Just as importantly, I want to emphasize that the in pari 
materia doctrine can be a purely textualist tool (as it was for 
Justice Scalia in Casey and for the Court in Wachovia Bank). The 
same-subject determination is simply the method for ensuring 
that judges are not given free rein to pick and choose their friends 
                                                                                                     
 360.  See MISREADING LAW, supra note 88, at 66 (“Most importantly, we need 
to stop talking about legislative history and start talking about evidence of 
legislative decisions.”).  
 361.  See supra Part III.D; see also John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 93–95 (2006) (praising 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Casey as textualist because of its reliance on 
“statutory usage” and contrasting it with a purposivist approach that looks to 
“contextual cues that reflect policy considerations”). 
 362.  See supra notes 274–285 and accompanying text.  
 363.  See, e.g., Committees of the U.S. Congress, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://perma.cc/Y9TP-XA2K (last visited October 7, 2019, 4:30 PM) (listing the 
committees of Congress and linking to legislation that originated in each 
committee).  
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wherever they can find them elsewhere in the United States 
Code.364 In other words, a same-subject determination based on a 
concrete, easily verifiable, non-manipulable rule-like criterion 
like Congress’s committee structure reduces judicial discretion in 
the game of interstatutory cross-referencing, thereby furthering a 
key goal of textualism.365  
The third objection—that statutory interpreters do not 
typically know which Congressional committee a law came 
from — may well be correct. But an objection based on what the 
objective statutory reader knows is precisely the grounds on 
which my big-picture claim in Part III of this Article is premised; 
either way, a textualist needs to answer the question of what the 
“appropriately informed” interpreter knows.366 Since viewing the 
objective statutory interpreter as the hypothetical “person on the 
street” would permit far too little interstatutory cross-referencing 
for even the dyed-in-the-wool textualist,367 the objection cannot be 
based solely on the fact that the “person on the street” lacks 
knowledge about congressional committees. My own sense is that 
the proposal I outlined in Part III—making the same-subject 
determination on the basis of legal practice areas, a proposal 
rooted in actual statutory readers who are generally lawyers with 
some specialization—more accurately reflects what the 
sophisticated textualist should seek: the appropriately informed 
reader is one who knows about other statutes based on the 
dividing lines of legal practice, since the appropriately informed 
                                                                                                     
 364.  Cf. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative 
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 142 (1983) (“It 
sometimes seems that citing legislative history is still, as my late colleague 
Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking out 
your friends.’” (quoting a personal conversation with Leventhal)); Conroy v. 
Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment) (citing 
Leventhal quip). 
 365.  See supra note 133. But see Gluck, supra note 26, at 177 (“Even 
formalist-textualist judges, it turns out, crave interpretive flexibility, do not 
want to be controlled by other courts or Congress, and feel the need to show 
their interpretive actions are democratically linked to Congress.”). 
 366.  See supra Part III.  
 367.  See supra Part III (noting that the objective appropriately informed 
reader of most laws is not the “person on the street”). 
INTERSTATUTORY INTERPRETATION 263 
reader is a lawyer who practices in the area that the statute to be 
interpreted is in.  
But I return to the textualist at this point to reinforce the 
key idea: there is no abstract notion of “subject matter” if one 
believes, as most textualists purport to, that statutory 
interpretation must be viewed through the lens of the objective 
reader. Rather, because the “appropriately informed” reader is 
going to vary from statute to statute, one must make a 
determination of who the “appropriately informed” reader of the 
particular statute being interpreted is and what that person 
knows (or, perhaps more precisely, what the law is going to 
expect that person to know). Virtually all interpreters expect 
statutory readers to know, for example, that statutes often have a 
definitions section. Even textualists generally agree that the 
definitions section of a statute overrides the “plain meaning” of a 
term.368 Why? As I said earlier, because the “appropriately 
informed” reader is expected to scour the statute to look for a 
definitions section if there is one. All judges, including 
textualists, expect the objective reader to know enough to look for 
a definitions section in a statute, no matter where in the statute 
(or even in the code) the definitions section might be. But, why 
would we expect the reader to do this? In large part because even 
the textualist understands that the “person on the street” is not 
the relevant reader for the interpretive task. Lawyers know to do 
this, but most laypeople do not.369 
Defending this “committee jurisdiction” proposal to 
textualists though is not my goal. As I said, this idea is clearly 
rooted in the intentionalist modality of statutory 
interpretation.370 So, I want to return to the proposal through the 
                                                                                                     
 368.  See Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) (unanimous 
decision relying on statutory definition contrary to ordinary meaning); see also 
GORSUCH, supra note 148, at 142–43 (praising Digital Realty Trust). But see 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 573–74 (1995) (rejecting statutory 
definition in favor of dictionary definition); James J. Brudney & Lawrence 
Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 557–58 (2013) (noting 
this point); Gluck, supra note 26, at 206 (criticizing this practice). 
 369.  See generally Anuj C. Desai, Textualism Step Zero (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 370.  See supra Part IV.A.  
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lens of an intentionalist. The proposal is premised on the fact 
that, for those involved in the lawmaking process, “committee 
jurisdiction [is] a fundamental organizing and interpretive 
principle.”371 Importantly, since the in pari materia doctrine, 
whether applied in its linguistic or its policy-coherence sense, is 
fundamentally asking about coherence across statutes, it matters 
that the “division of Congress into committees creates drafting 
‘silos’,”372 and that there is a “lack of communication across these 
committees during the drafting process.”373  
Thus, as a first cut, an intentionalist should conclude that 
any two statutes that came out of different committees are 
necessarily not in pari materia with each other. But my proposal 
goes further, positing that any two statutes that did come out of 
the same committee should, at least as a rebuttable presumption, 
be treated as in pari materia with each other. That, I admit, is a 
tougher sell in purely intentionalist terms, but it does have a 
couple of advantages. First, as I noted above, it is relatively 
rule-like: even intentionalists put some stock in decision costs, 
even if reducing them isn’t an explicit goal. Second, it comports 
with what at least a significant proportion of drafters believe.374 
3. Congressional Committees in a World of Diminished Committee 
Power 
My emphasis on committees does run up against a few trends 
in the federal legislative process over the past few decades, such 
as the rise in omnibus legislation and the increase in bills driven 
by congressional leadership outside of the committee structure.375 
                                                                                                     
 371.  Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 747. 
 372.  Id. 
 373.  Id. at 749 (emphasis added); see also id. at 750 (discussing “[d]ifferent 
drafting practices and manuals”). 
 374.  See Schultz Bressman & Gluck Part II, supra note 172, at 749–50 
(stating that forty-three percent of respondents say “presumption of consistent 
usage applies across statutes in related subject-matter areas precisely because 
the same committee is drafting”). To be sure, this evidence is limited to the 
presumption of consistent usage and thus to the textual version of the in pari 
materia doctrine.  
 375.  See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory 
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An omnibus statute does not inherently undermine my 
proposal as long as the relevant title of the statute came from a 
committee. In order to apply my proposal to an omnibus statute, 
the interpreter would simply have to treat the relevant title as its 
own statute, determine which committee it came from, and then 
make the same-subject determination on that basis. To be sure, 
omnibus legislation pushes on the broader notion of coherence 
across statutes that animates the in pari materia doctrine.376 But 
by itself, the fact that the portions of law being interpreted were 
passed simultaneously with other provisions on unrelated topics, 
provisions that originated in some other committee (and/or even 
the other house of Congress) does not change the basic premise of 
my proposal, that defining subject matter through the lens of the 
lawmaking process requires a focus on the committee level.377 
Importantly, what matters is that a particular committee played 
a role in the relevant statutory language, not how extensive a role 
the particular committee played: the same-subject determination, 
unlike other aspects of statutory interpretation, is in both theory 
and practice a binary variable, an on-off switch, and so is 
amenable to the relatively rule-like presumption I am proposing, 
notwithstanding subtleties of the legislative process that 
minimize the relative importance of committees in the 
development of the final product of statutory language. 
The rise of legislation driven by and originating with party 
leadership though does undermine my proposal. If a particular 
statute never touched any congressional committee, then there is 
simply no way to connect that statute to a committee. It is 
                                                                                                     
Interpretation: Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to 
Omnibus Legislations, 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1 (2002) (exploring the 
effect of omnibus legislation on traditional canons of statutory interpretation).  
 376.  See id. at 2 (“I will discuss the effect of omnibus lawmaking on canons 
of construction, including coherence canons.”); id. at 6 (noting the difficulty of 
embedding coherence into statutory interpretation in the context of omnibus 
legislation in particular). 
 377.  Although I am purposely avoiding any discussion of statutory 
interpretation at the state level, the fact that most states have a single-subject 
rule for legislation, a rule with at least a little bite, see Brannon P. Denning & 
Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation 
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 1005–23 (1999), might diminish this 
problem at the state level. 
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difficult for me to know precisely how to respond to this 
phenomenon, except to say that, if committees were to become a 
shell of their former selves and lose their role in lawmaking, then 
it would be unreasonable for a subjective intentionalist to use 
committees as the demarcation lines for subject matter. That is 
the fate of a proposal tied to the realities of the lawmaking 
process: it depends on the realities of that process! When that 
process changes, so too should a subjective intentionalist’s 
approach to interpreting statutes. 
V. Conclusion 
Statutory interpretation practice abounds with 
interstatutory cross-referencing; and yet statutory interpretation 
theory has largely ignored it. Courts have always looked for 
interpretive assistance outside of the four corners of a statute 
being interpreted, including elsewhere in the statutory corpus. 
The in pari materia doctrine is one of the most powerful methods 
for using other statutes because it allows an interpreter to draw 
on another statute’s text, purpose and/or jurisprudence. Applying 
the doctrine not only helps courts understand how to interpret a 
particular statute but also helps maintain coherence across 
statutes. 
To keep coherence within manageable bounds, however, 
courts seek such coherence only among statutes that are “on the 
same subject;” and so determining whether two statues are on the 
same subject becomes a crucial preliminary step in this vital 
method of interstatutory cross-referencing. 
What I hope to have shown is that this crucial first step in 
interstatutory cross-referencing can be tied to statutory 
interpretation theory and that thinking about it through the lens 
of statutory interpretation theory can help give courts better tools 
for making that determination. 
Just as importantly, though, I hope to have shown that 
thinking about interstatutory cross-referencing through the lens 
of modern approaches to statutory interpretation helps us better 
understand those approaches themselves. In particular, it lays 
bare the fact that textualism requires a more robust theory of 
statutory audience. While textualists can answer many 
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interpretive questions by eliding the question of audience or by 
implicitly assuming the statutory reader is just a reasonably 
intelligent layperson, neither answer is of any help in 
determining when interstatutory cross-referencing is appropriate. 
My proposed solution to the problem—focus on sub-communities 
of legal practice as the relevant linguistic communities—will 
probably not satisfy most textualists, in large part I suspect, 
because it runs counter to the Benthamite strand in textualist 
thinking. But as I hope I made clear, I am not tied to any 
particular delineating lines for what constitutes the relevant 
linguistic community. Rather, the point is that a textualist 
approach to determining whether to engage in interstatutory 
cross-referencing requires a careful consideration of statutory 
audience and thus an equally careful delineation of the statutes’ 
relevant linguistic communities. Textualism needs a better 
theory of statutory audience, and thinking about the dilemma of 
interstatutory interpretation is a good first place to start. 
 
